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THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PIERCING THE
CORPORATE VEIL IN THE PARENTSUBSIDIARY CONTEXT*
JOHN H. MATHESON **

Today, massive corporations-bothnationaland internationaldominate financial and commercial activities, exercising
enormous economic power.
The standard organizational
structurefor these businesses has a parent corporationas the sole
shareholder of multiple, separately incorporated operating
subsidiaries(or layers of subsidiaries)in a corporategroup.
One particularapplication of the law of corporate groups entails
dealing with the ramifications of subsidiary insolvency. Given
the massive financial assets of many multinational parent
corporations, actions to ignore the legal separateness of a
corporate subsidiary of a parent company offer some of the
biggest potential payoffs for claimants. In today's global
economic world, the primary impact of piercing theory and
applicationcomes in the context of these corporategroups.
Empirical analysis treating the application of substantive
piercing doctrine to the parent-subsidiary context is virtually
nonexistent. This Article begins to fill that void. The underlying
project is an empirical analysis of piercing the corporate veil in
the parent-subsidiary context. The Article's first objective is to
describe statistically the propensities of modern courts for
piercing the corporate veil in the parent-subsidiarysituation. Its
second objective is to use advanced statistical techniques to
explore potential causal relationshipsregardingpiercing the veil
in the parent-subsidiary context. Both of these objectives are
unique to this study. The hope is that courts, commentators, and
practitioners may be better equipped to understand and predict
* Copyright © 2009 by John H. Matheson.
Law Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School;
Of Counsel, Kaplan, Strangis and Kaplan, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota. I want to thank
my excellent research assistants, including most especially Nathan List (Class of 2007) and
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under what circumstancesa court is likely to exercise its equitable
discretion and hold a parent company liable.
Some of the empirical results of this study, even on a
descriptive level, are startling. Among the statistically significant
findings are:
0
Courts seldom pierce the subsidiary's corporate veil
and do so much less often than in the overall universe of
piercing cases, including the classic case of a small business
with one or a few individual owners.
•
Appellate courts pierce approximately twice as often as
trialcourts.
*
Entity plaintiffs are more than twice as likely as
individual plaintiffs to successfully pierce the subsidiary's
veil.
0
Courts are three times more likely to pierce in a
contractcase than in a tort case.
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1.

II.

III.
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INTRODUCTION

The limited liability entity called the "corporation" has been
both reveled and reviled. One early commentator described it as "the
greatest single discovery of modern times," so that "[e]ven steam and
electricity are far less important than the limited liability corporation,
and they would be reduced to comparative impotence without it."'
Yet, another early analyst attacked corporate limited liability as a
"mode of swindling, quite common and honourable in these United
States" and "a fraud on the honest and confiding part of the public."2
The debate continues unabated, with some current academics calling
for bolstering limited liability, while others advocate limiting or
eliminating corporate limited liability altogether.'
Today, massive corporations, both national and international,
dominate financial and commercial activities, exercising enormous

1. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, WHY SHOULD WE CHANGE OUR FORM OF
GOVERNMENT? 82 (1912). Butler was then serving as President of Columbia University.
2. THOMAS COOPER, LECTURES ON THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 247,
250 (A.M. Kelley 1971) (1829).
3. Compare, e.g., Daniel J. Morrissey, PiercingAll the Veils: Applying an Established
Doctrine to a New Business Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 533 (2007) (arguing that, because
"LLCs and LLPs offer their members and partners more direct management power than
usually afforded shareholders," there is "greater justification to hold them personally
accountable for the obligations of their businesses"), with Nina A. Mendelson, A ControlBased Approach to Shareholder Liabilityfor Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203,
1271-79 (2002) (espousing unlimited liability for torts in the parent subsidiary context),
and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 79
(2005) ("[T]he case against veil piercing applies with equal force to LLCs as to
corporations.").
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economic power.4 The standard organizational structure for these
businesses has a parent corporation as the sole shareholder of

multiple, separately incorporated operating subsidiaries.' As with the
formation of any limited liability entity, a primary purpose for this
parent-subsidiary organizational structure is to minimize the potential
liability of the parent company for the operations and potential claims
against its operating subsidiaries.6 The "law of corporate groups"

refers to the application of the law to these multi-entity business
organizations.7
One particular application of the law of corporate groups entails
dealing with the ramifications of subsidiary insolvency. Global
competition, product and
management failures, economic

fluctuations, government regulation, tort claims, and environmental
cleanups are just some of the circumstances and events that may
imperil the financial life of a subsidiary company. When a subsidiary
corporation is subject to significant unsatisfied claims or impending

bankruptcy, claimants may call upon the courts to exercise traditional
equitable powers to ignore the legal separateness of the subsidiary

4. For example, more than half of the world's one hundred largest economic entities
at the beginning of the twenty-first century were corporations, not countries. See SARAH
ANDERSON & JOHN CAVANAGH, TOP 200: THE RISE OF CORPORATE GLOBAL POWER 3

(1996), http://www.rachel.org/files/documentfTop 200TheRise_oLCorporateGlobalPower.pdf. Using different measures, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD") reported in 2002 that twenty-nine of the world's largest
economic entities were transnational corporations. Press Release, UNCTAD, Are
Transnationals Bigger Than Countries? (Dec. 8, 2002), http://www.unctad.org/
Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=2426&intltemlD=2079&lang=l.
5. As of 2007, there were an estimated 77,000 transnational corporations in the
world, with more than 770,000 foreign affiliates. UNCTAD, The Universe of the Largest
Transnational Corporations, 1 10, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/2 (2007). A
sampling of a dozen companies in the top fifty of the 2008 Fortune Global 500 shows a
range of subsidiaries from 9 to 2,259, with an average of 399.75. See World's Largest
Corporations: Global 500, FORTUNE, July 21, 2008, at 165, available at http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global5OO/2008/full-list/. The companies sampled and
the number of subsidiaries are ExxonMobil (167), Royal Dutch Shell (212), BP (62),
Toyota Motor (35), General Electric (86), Citigroup (2,259), HSBC Holdings (40), Bank
of America (1,174), UBS (123), JP Morgan Chase (384), American Intl. Group (246), and
Royal Bank of Scotland (9). Id.
6. For a discussion of the evolution of corporateness and limited liability, see John
H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Call for a Unified Business Organization Law, 65 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1996).

7. The concept and label of the law of corporate groups was popularized by PHILLIP
I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS:
LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS

PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE

(1983); see also Phillip I. Blumberg,
The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law: The Law of Corporate Groups, 37
CONN. L. REV. 605, 607 (2005) [hereinafter Blumberg, Transformation] (discussing the
rise of the corporate group as a response to the industrial revolution).
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and to hold the parent company liable for the subsidiary's debts.
Given the massive financial assets of many multinational parent
corporations, actions seeking to ignore the legal separateness of a
corporate subsidiary of a parent company offer some of the biggest
potential payoffs for claimants. This may be part of the reason that
piercing the corporate veil is "the most litigated issue in corporate
law." 8 In any event, there is "a sizable and increasing body of
literature suggesting that the real focus of the piercing problem is in
the area of parent and subsidiary law." 9
The common law of piercing the corporate veil, generally
recognized by both courts and commentators as an incomprehensible
mess,1" is then brought to bear on this increasingly important category
of legal disputes. Unfortunately, although piercing the corporate veil
may be heavily litigated, little empirical research has investigated the
circumstances under which courts actually pierce the corporate veil.11
In particular, despite academic calls for a separate analysis of the
corporate group context, 2 with its resulting expanded or unlimited
8. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate
Shareholdersas Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 383 (1999).
9.

STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:7, at 1-45 (1991).

10. Legal luminaries agree that this standard is muddled. Compare Berkey v. Third
Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The whole problem of the
relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the
mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."), with ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW § 2.1, at 38 (1986) ("Do you notice anything intellectually disturbing
about this [standard piercing-the-corporate-veil] formulation? That's right; it's vague. It
hardly gives you any concrete idea about which conduct does or does not trigger the
doctrine-not enough of an idea, at least, to give you the ability to counsel clients in a
meaningful way."); see also Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J.CORP. L. 41, 41
(2000) ("Most Commentators recognize that it is jurisprudence without substance."). For
a discussion of the state of judicial piercing analysis, see John H. Matheson & Raymond B.
Eby, The Doctrine of Piercingthe Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An
Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners' Limited-Liability Protection, 75
WASH. L. REV. 147, 173-82 (2000).

11. The prior empirical work on substantive piercing involved simple descriptive
a counting and categorization of cases, with no statistical analysis. See,
statistics-that is,
e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1036, 1044-47 (1991). In 1999, Professor Thompson purported to extend his
original database through 1996 but once again simply counted and categorized cases.
Thompson, supra note 8, at 385. In 2008, two authors, apparently then students, purported
to update Thompson's original study by considering a "random sampling of cases reported
in Westlaw from January 1, 1986 through December 31, 1995." Lee C. Hodge & Andrew
B. Sachs, Empirical Study, Piercingthe Mist: Bringingthe Thompson Study into the 1990s,
43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 347 (2008); see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp,
Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Response to Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063, 1068-69
(2006) (addressing sixty-one LLC piercing cases from 1997 to 2005).
12. See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
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parent liability, empirical analysis treating the application of the
substantive piercing doctrine to the parent-subsidiary context is
virtually nonexistent.
The purpose of this Article is to shed empirical light on an area
of much rhetorical heat. The underlying project is an empirical
analysis of piercing the corporate veil in the parent-subsidiary
context. This Article's first objective is to statistically describe the
propensities of modern courts for piercing the corporate veil in the
parent-subsidiary situation. Its second objective is to use advanced
statistical techniques to explore potential causal relationships
regarding piercing the veil in the parent-subsidiary context. To the
extent they are focused on the parent-subsidiary context, both of
these objectives are unique to this study. The hope is that courts,
commentators, and practitioners may be better equipped to
understand and predict under what circumstances a court is likely to
exercise its equitable discretion and hold a parent company liable.
This study has international implications as well.
Many
multinational corporations headquartered outside of the United
States operate within the United States through separately
incorporated subsidiaries. These subsidiaries, like all other American
corporations, are incorporated under state law. When claims are
brought against the American subsidiary, claimants may seek to
pierce the subsidiary's corporate veil to hold the multinational parent
liable. In these circumstances, courts in the United States generally
apply the law of the state of the subsidiary's incorporation to the
piercing determination.13 This choice of law principle, referred to as
the internal affairs doctrine, dictates that the decision to pierce turns
on a review of the common law of the subsidiary's state of
incorporation. Thus, state law will ultimately determine the liability
of a German, French, British, Chinese, or Indian parent company.
Beyond this primary functional application to international
corporations is the considerable impact of U.S. common law on

13. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 53 (1998) (upholding the
principle of separate corporateness for parent and subsidiary, applying the presumptive
application of the common law internal affairs doctrine, and stating that federal piercing
law does not apply simply because a federal statute, in this case CERCLA, is involved);
Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 378-79 (7th
Cir. 2008) (applying the internal affairs doctrine to choice of law decision when
considering whether to pierce the corporate veil in parent-subsidiary situation); see also
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622
(1983) (refusing to give "conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state," Cuba, in an
international case involving a Cuban banking institution).
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foreign legal systems, many of which draw heavily from American
concepts and court decisions. t4
Although some have
This empirical project is unique.
undertaken empirical counting of piercing decisions previously,15 this
study is the first to examine the concededly distinct question of
substantive piercing in the corporate group context. The empirical
results of this study, even on a descriptive level, are startling. Among
the statistically significant findings are:
*
Courts seldom pierce the subsidiary's corporate veil, and
do so much less often than in the overall universe of piercing
cases, including the classic case of a small business with either
one or a few individual owners.
*
Appellate courts pierce approximately twice as often as
courts.
trial
*
Entity plaintiffs are more than twice as likely as individual
plaintiffs to successfully pierce the subsidiary's veil.
*
Courts are three times more likely to pierce in a contract
case than in a tort case.
In addition, this project is the first to apply to substantive piercing the
techniques of statistical logistic regression analysis, a method
generally recognized as a necessary and effective means of
understanding empirical data in a multi-factor context.
Part I presents a brief discussion of the history of veil piercing,
the disparate viewpoints surrounding piercing the corporate veil and
enterprise liability in the parent-subsidiary context, and a review of
prior empirical piercing research. Part II discusses the research
design and explains the methodology employed in this study for
capturing the relevant data. Part III presents the empirical results of
this study, both in descriptive and in analytical form, including
14. See KAREN VANDEKERCKHOVE, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 28 (2007)
(observing, as part of an international study of piercing systems, that "[i]t is fair to
consider the United States as the origin of the doctrine of corporate veil piercing"). See
generally Sandra K. Miller, Piercingthe Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the

European Community and in the United States: A Comparative Analysis of U.S., German
and U.K. Veil-Piercing Approaches, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 73, 79-85 (1998) (discussing the

relative hesitancy or readiness with which various foreign courts approach the decision to
pierce the corporate veil); Binda Sahni, The Interpretationof the Corporate Personalityof
TransnationalCorporations,15 WIDENER L. 1 (2005) (examining how courts in various
foreign jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Argentina, and India,
apply current piercing laws).
15. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
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insights brought to bear by logistic regression analysis. Finally, this
Article sets forth some conclusions regarding the application of
piercing and related doctrines in the parent-subsidiary context.
I. PIERCING THEORY, ENTERPRISE LIABILITY, AND PRIOR
EMPIRICAL WORK

A.

Piercingand EnterpriseLiability Theory

Perhaps the single most salient characteristic of the business
corporation, indeed probably its legal raison d'Otre, is the presumptive
limited liability afforded to its owners, called shareholders or
stockholders. The modern corporation, as a creature of statute, exists
as a legal person separate from its owners. 6 It employs agents and
employees, contracts with third parties, commits torts, makes
philanthropic donations, grows and develops, and ultimately may
merge, be acquired, or dissolve. Corporate assets are available to
satisfy corporate debts and obligations. Shareholders are shielded
from these claims by recognition of the corporation's separate legal
existence. 7
The common-law courts have never been completely
comfortable with the concept of corporate limited liability. Although
use of the corporate form for the operation of a business statutorily
shields the personal assets of its shareholders from the claims of the
business's creditors, a court may be asked to ignore this liability shield
when a claimant finds the corporation unable to pay its debts. In
order to impose such shareholder liability, the claimant asks the court
equitably to disregard or "pierce" the statutory limited-liability shield
so that the corporate debts might be satisfied out of the shareholders'
personal assets. Absent a judicial decision to pierce the corporate veil
in this manner, the limited liability created by the applicable
corporate statute stays intact, and the creditor must shoulder the
loss. 8
16. The existence of a corporate person necessarily involves the recognition of the
three following principles: (1) the corporation is a person distinct from its members; (2)
the property of the corporation is distinct from the property of its members; and (3) the
property of its members cannot be taken in execution for the debt of the corporation and
vice versa. See 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 482 (1942).
17. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (2008) ("Unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally
liable for the acts or debts of the corporation .... ). For a discussion of the evolution of
corporateness and limited liability, see Matheson & Olson, supra note 6, at 5-9.
18. For a discussion of the elements of the common law application of the piercing
doctrine generally, see Matheson & Eby, supra note 10, at 173-82.
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Even though veil piercing is often central to litigation, the
classical doctrine makes it difficult to predict how a court will rule.
Professor Blumberg has described the classical theory of veil piercing
from subsidiary to parent, stating:
Traditional "piercing" jurisprudence rests on a demonstration
of three fundamental elements:
the subsidiary's lack of
independent existence; the fraudulent, inequitable, or wrongful
use of the corporate form; and a causal relationship to the
plaintiff's loss. Unless each of these three elements has been
shown, courts have traditionally held "piercing" unavailable.19
Unfortunately, the tests used by the courts to determine the existence
of these elements are vague and inconsistent. Application of these
tests often consists largely of lists that courts recite with little analysis
or justification."0 A sample list from one court recites:
[1] insufficient capitalization for purposes of corporate
undertaking, [2] failure to observe corporate formalities, [3]
nonpayment of dividends, [4] insolvency of debtor corporation
at time of transaction in question, [5] siphoning of funds by
dominant shareholder, [6] nonfunctioning of other officers and
directors, [7] absence of corporate records, and [8] existence of
corporation as merely a facade for individual dealings.2'
Yet, courts do little to clarify the relative weight given to each factor
or how they interact. In the typical traditional piercing analysis, the
presence of "[a]n unspecified number of these factors, combined with
an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness," could justify
19. Blumberg, Transformation,supra note 7, at 612.
20. The failure of courts' attempts to articulate a single test for disregarding the
corporate form and holding the owners of a corporation responsible for the business's
financial obligations has resulted in a number of overlapping lists of factors that are passed
off as tests. See, e.g., Richard v. Bell At. Corp., 946 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D.D.C. 1996) (setting
out four different tests); Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 98-99 (W. Va. 1986)
(listing nineteen factors); Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509,
512 (Minn. 1979) (listing eight factors).
21. Victoria Elevator, 283 N.W.2d at 512. Even casual consideration of this list shows
its infirmities. Some factors, such as "nonpayment of dividends," are standard operating
procedure and smart business practice for the small business with individual owners
subject to personal taxation of distributions. Some factors are seemingly contradictory,
such as "nonpayment of dividends" and "siphoning of funds." A corporation can only pay
out money to the shareholders or not. Yet, no matter the corporation's choice, a court
may find fault with its decision. Other factors, such as "existence of corporation as merely
a facade for individual dealings," are not factors at all but merely conclusions. Finally,
other factors, such as "failure to observe corporate formalities," seem irrelevant to the
decision to ignore statutorily prescribed limited liability. See Matheson & Eby, supra note
10, at 173-76.
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disregarding the corporation and holding the owners liable for a claim
that will otherwise go unsatisfied.2 2
Commentators have frequently criticized the manner in which
courts apply the piercing doctrine, by relying upon conclusory terms,
as opposed to a formal framework, and thus producing resultsoriented decisions.23 From an academic perspective, courts often
provide little analysis of underlying facts and fail to discuss the policy
rationales behind the use of specific piercing factors or even to clearly
articulate specific relevant factors in their determinations. Veil
piercing "seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare,
severe, and unprincipled."24 This ad hoc judicial approach to piercing
does not diminish the desire of practitioners and corporate managers
to understand and predict how courts will respond in piercing cases.
More fundamentally, these disparate judicial results and apparent
inconsistencies demonstrate the need for the more rigorous empirical
and statistical analysis of actual results that this Article undertakes.
This lack of clarity has led commentators to complain that the
courts are merely copying a template of variables articulated in
previous cases, which the courts then apply in an inconsistent
manner." This criticism gives rise to several questions: What factors
do courts articulate? What factors do they actually use in their
determination? What factors are "the big ones"? And is the decision
to pierce generally predicated upon whether the corporate form has
been used to commit a fraud or misrepresentation? This latter factor
of fraud or misrepresentation is the linchpin of the analysis proffered
by Dean Robert Clark.26 According to Clark, piercing cases represent
a subset of a broader spectrum of fraudulent conveyance law.27 When
22. Matheson & Eby, supra note 10, at 173 n.127.
23. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing,26 J. CORP. L. 479, 513
(2001) ("Judicial opinions in this area tend to open with vague generalities and close with
conclusory statements with little or no concrete analysis in between. There simply are no
[sic] bright-line rules for deciding when courts will pierce the corporate veil.").
24. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985). Stephen Bainbridge has complained that its use is "rare,
unprincipled, and arbitrary," and is also completely lacking in "bright-line rules for
deciding when courts will pierce the corporate veil." Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 535,
513.

25. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 109 (arguing that veil-piercing tests
used by the courts are arbitrary and unhelpful); Davis Millon, Piercingthe Corporate Veil,
Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1327

(2007) (describing veil-piercing factors as an "unweighted laundry list").
26. CLARK, supra note 10, at 38.

27. See id.at 39 ("[Tjhe doctrines of equitable subordination and piercing the
corporate veil are often applications of the same basic principles that underlie fraudulent
conveyance law.").

2009]

MODERN LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS

1101

the corporation is used to escape corporate obligations rather than
advance productive purposes, Clark would predict that courts will

pierce the veil.28
Many commentators argue that whatever the weaknesses of the
current judicial tests for piercing the corporate veil generally, the case
for disregarding the corporate entity is more compelling when the
shareholder itself is another corporate entity-namely, that the
corporations exist in the parent-subsidiary context.2 9 They may
concede that the grant of limited liability to individual investors can

advance economic policies by, among other things, encouraging a
broader base of passive participants in business investment and
funding.3" Yet, they argue limited liability in the parent-subsidiary
context is inappropriate because the principal justification for limited
liability-encouraging investors to provide capital for new business
ventures-does not apply to the parent-subsidiary context.31
In the typical parent-subsidiary situation, the parent corporation
is generally the sole shareholder and provides all of the capital
investment in the subsidiary.3 2 "Even if ...a parent corporation is

28. Id. at 71-81.
29. See, e.g., Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L.
REV. 637, 664-65 (2005) (asserting that the current justifications for limited liability do not
apply in the corporate group context); John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the
Veil to Assert PersonalJurisdiction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the
Cannon Doctrine,84 B.U. L. REV. 445, 446 (2004).
30. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1566 (1991) (describing "the traditional corporate and economic
justifications for limited liability" as "the need to encourage investment in productive,
albeit risky, activities"). But see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward
Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991) (observing that
limited liability "creates incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting corporations to
avoid the full costs of their activities"). Following the Industrial Revolution, capitalintensive businesses required substantial expenditures beyond the means of the typical
entrepreneur, requiring the infusion of outside investment.
See Blumberg,
Transformation, supra note 7, at 607. Granting limited liability to those who contributed
capital encouraged investment because people could invest without risking their full
personal net worth. Id. The development of modern capital markets depended on limited
liability because, although investors may be willing to risk their entire net worth in
businesses they themselves operate, they are not willing-absent limited liability-to
invest in businesses that they do not operate or closely monitor. Id. Limited liability
continues to enable venture capitalists and casual investors to invest in diverse enterprises
without incurring the excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise closely.
31. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L.
573, 574-75 (1986) (criticizing corporations' frivolous creation of subsidiaries to insulate
themselves from liability).
32. There may be unusual situations, such as joint ventures, where there are two or
even several entity shareholders, where one of them may or may not hold a majority of the
subsidiary's equity interest.
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not insulated from the liabilities of its subsidiaries, the ultimate
individual shareholders [of the parent] would still be protected."3 3
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel stated their
conclusions about piercing in this parent-subsidiary context as a
function of economic analysis:
Courts are more likely to allow creditors to reach the assets of
shareholders where limited liability provides minimal gains
from improved liquidity and diversification, while creating a
high probability that a firm will engage in a socially excessive
level of risk taking .... [One] major category of piercing cases
involves parent-subsidiary combinations, where creditors of the
subsidiary attempt to reach assets of the parent. Courts'
greater willingness to allow creditors to reach the assets of
corporate as opposed to personal shareholders is again
consistent with economic principles.34
Similarly, economic analysis knows no political boundaries. One
international scholar summarizes the transnational case for veil
piercing in corporate groups as follows:
Particularly with respect to corporate groups, it is frequently
opined that the economic arguments supporting limited liability
are premised on the idea of the single corporation with its
individual investors. These arguments would not apply in a
situation where a parent corporation actively engages in the
business together with its subsidiaries. In such a situation there
are no passive investors to be protected, there usually is no
separation of ownership and control, there is no need to
encourage widespread distribution of shares and there are no
information and monitoring costs. Parent corporations are able
to diversify their portfolio and spread the risks themselves; in
addition, financial institutions as investors, contrary to
individual investors, have the same ability to diversify. Also the
argument relating to the efficiency of the capital markets is less
relevant when all of the subsidiary's shares are owned by the
parent. Finally, the enforcement costs of creditors are less in

33. Swain & Aguilar, supra note 29, at 446.
34. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 109-11; see also Fred S. McChesney,
Doctrinal Analysis and StatisticalModeling in Law: The Case of Defective Incorporation,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 493, 512 (1993) ("Under the Easterbrook and Fischel model, limited
liability would be upheld rarely in parent-subsidiary cases."). As the statistics in this
Article will demonstrate, Easterbrook and Fischel's factual assertion that courts have a
"greater willingness to allow creditors to reach the assets of corporate as opposed to
personal shareholders," Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 110-11, is not borne out
by the facts.
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corporate groups since creditors can proceed directly against
the parent instead of numerous stockholders. As a result, both
from the historical and from the economic perspective, limited
liability and corporate groups would not constitute a good
marriage.
Thus, the law and economics perspective is clear: the social or
economic utility of limited liability for businesses in general does not
apply when those businesses are operated in a parent-subsidiary or
other corporate group configuration. While this conclusion by itself
may not be startling, the fact that it is widely shared by scholars not
inclined to the law and economics mode of analysis is significant.
Indeed, the pressure for more expansive, if not unlimited, parent
liability in the parent-subsidiary context has resulted in legal
commentators arguing for the courts to impose a form of "enterprise
liability." They note that a few courts have imposed liability on the
modern corporate group if it is determined that the parent and
subsidiary operate as one "single business entity."36 In essence,
acceptance of this theory rests on the determination of a single factor,
namely, whether the parent so dominates the subsidiary's business
operations that the subsidiary does not have a separate existence. If
so found, "the 'excessive' exercise of 'control' depriving a subsidiary
or other subservient party of any significant decision-making power
suffices for the application of enterprise law in those jurisdictions
35. VANDEKERCKHOVE, supra note 14, at 9.

36. For example, in a 2005 symposium sponsored by the Connecticut Law Review in
honor of Dean Philip I. Blumberg, Symposium, The Changing Face of Parent and
Subsidiary Corporation: Entity vs. Enterprise Liability, 37 CONN. L. REV. 605, 605-817

(2005), the authors variously called for more expanded liability for parent corporations,
echoing Dean Blumberg's mantra that, "'piercing the veil' has proven a failure."
Blumberg, Transformation, supra note 7, at 611. Kurt Strasser summarized the authors'
calls for expanded liability, stating:
This "single business enterprise" liability coexists as a minor but apparently
durable tributary to the main stream of veil piercing liability. By looking to the
whole business, rather than its constituent separate corporate entities, "single
business enterprise" avoids completely a direct discussion of the policies of limited
liability as it focuses on the business enterprise rather than separate liability rules
for the individual corporate entity and its corporate parent shareholder. The
doctrine could theoretically serve as a vehicle to supplant all veil piercing law for
corporate groups, but this has not been its history and is not its current prospect.
"Single business enterprise" doctrinal merits are appealing, for the doctrine's view
of the structure of the modern large business corporate group is generally an
accurate one. However, there appears to be no widespread movement to embrace
this vision beyond its adoption in Texas and Louisiana and the limited application
in a few other states it has seen thus far.
Strasser, supra note 29, at 647.
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accepting the 'single-factor' form of 'piercing' jurisprudence."37 Even
while pointing out that some cases have applied an expanded or
single-factor liability test, enterprise liability's staunchest proponent,
Dean Blumberg, candidly admits that, "[n]otwithstanding this
erosion, 'traditional three-factor piercing' continues to dominate
American law."38

Nevertheless, whether explored in terms of traditional veilpiercing precepts or in terms of expanded enterprise or singlebusiness entity liability, the debate over what the courts should be
doing must proceed in light of clear facts about what they actually are
doing. The purpose of this Article is not to take sides as to whether
or not limited liability should be curtailed in the corporate group
context. Rather, the purpose here is to systematically determine what
modern courts have actually been doing in terms of holding parent
corporations liable for the acts and obligations of their subsidiaries.
What is sought is a clear, focused, and unbiased presentation of when
the courts hold parent companies responsible for the liabilities of
their subsidiaries, and identification of what factors are important
when they do so. Exploration of these empirical results must inform
the debate surrounding limited liability, veil piercing, and enterprise
liability.
B.

Previous Empirical Efforts

Empirical study of piercing data, like that in many other areas of
legal discourse, is still in relative infancy. As discussed below, the few

37. Blumberg, Transformation,supra note 7, at 610. In the bankruptcy context, the
same result may be achieved through what is sometimes referred to as "substantive
consolidation." See William H. Widen, CorporateForm and Substantive Consolidation, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237 (2007). This raises the question whether the power to control
the subsidiary, interlocking directorates, common corporate officers, and economic and
functional integration is enough in the parent-subsidiary context to pierce the corporate
veil. From one perspective, it would seem not to be, as these factors can be seen as
relatively normal and legitimate consequences of the single shareholder nature of the
parent-subsidiary relationship. See, e.g., DAVID SUGARMAN & GUNTHER TEUBNER,
REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE 317 (1990) ("The [corporate] group
enterprise is ...the 'most efficient and flexible organizational form for business
operations in the present conditions of market and society.' "). Nevertheless, such an
enterprise liability or single-factor theory does have some critics. See, e.g., Marilyn
Montano, The Single Business Enterprise Theory in Texas: A Singularly Bad Idea?, 55
BAYLOR L. REV. 1163 1187-1200 (2003); Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion,
"Single Business Enterprise," "Alter Ego," and Other Errors: Academics, Economics,
Democracy, and ShareholderLimited Liability: Back Towards a Unitary "Abuse" Theory
of Piercingthe CorporateVeil, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 405, 415-27 (2006).
38. Blumberg, Transformation,supra note 7, at 613.
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efforts to date, while helpful, have limitations that relate both to the
database and the research tools employed.
In 1991, Professor Robert Thompson undertook a watershed
categorization of cases involving piercing the corporate veil.39 The
Thompson study examined almost 1,600 cases pertaining to piercing
the corporate veil,' reporting that the corporate veil is pierced in
about forty percent of reported cases.4 The major focus of the
Thompson study was substantive veil piercing, although he included
jurisdictional cases as well as substantive piercing cases, and statutory
cases as well as common law ones.4 2
Professor Thompson's study became a standard reference point
in both business organization casebooks and in subsequent articles
relating to veil piercing. Although the Thompson study was an
important beginning, it was aimed primarily at simple case counting
and categorization. Thus, it suffered from significant statistical
limitations. As Professor Fred McChesney stated in his landmark
article identifying the limitations of case counting alone, "the
difficulty of identifying standards in any line of cases ...may lie as

much in the deficiencies of legal research techniques as in any judicial
'fuzziness.' "' In that vein, he found prior analytical and empirical
work on piercing wanting:
Though clearly an advance in the level of corporate law
discourse, the rethinking begun by Clark and by Easterbrook
and Fischel and carried forward by Thompson is not wholly
satisfactory methodologically. Merely counting cases and
sorting them into various pigeonholes according to expressed
judicial rationales (the process used by Thompson for veilpiercing cases and by Frey in studying defective incorporation)
suffers from at least two deficiencies relevant to analyzing
defective incorporation. 44

39. Thompson, supra note 11, at 1038.
40. The study asserts that "all Westlaw cases through 1985 concerning the issue of
piercing the corporate veil" were examined. Id. at 1044.
41. See id. at 1048.
42. Id. at 1044-45.
43. McChesney, supra note 34, at 495. Professor McChesney's article was "the first to
use multiple regression to discern the separate legal reasons for judicial decisions in a
purely common-law domain." Id. at 519. The statistical techniques McChesney used have
been employed subsequently by other authors. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce
Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in
Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1067, 1093-94 (2006); Swain & Aguilar, supra note 29, at
449-50.
44. McChesney, supra note 34, at 515.
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According to Professor McChesney, these deficiencies relate to the
fact that judges, in deciding cases, may not always explain the
complete rationale for their decisions, and it is necessary to look at
underlying fact patterns in order to understand a court's decision.45
Law students and lawyers learn to correct for this limitation by
distinguishing cases based on the underlying facts and not just on
statements of the law by the court. In addition, and more
fundamentally, mere counting of cases and descriptive statistics
cannot adequately account for multi-factor tests, such as those used in
veil-piercing cases. Several factors or combinations of factors may
explain case results rather than individual factors.46

Finally, any

statistical review of a multi-factor judicial analysis may run into the
problems of assigning weights to the various factors and isolating the
separate effects of factors that may operate simultaneously.
The Thompson study and those similar to it include only
descriptive statistics with no tests for statistical significance.47 Indeed,
Professor Thompson recognized the limitations of such simple casecounting descriptive statistics at the time of his study.48 Moreover, no
study has looked solely at the corporate group context to analyze the
various factors and issues present in piercing the corporate veil of a
parent corporation to recover for the debts of a subsidiary. Multiple
regression analysis, "a statistical technique that can solve the
problems of calculating the influence of individual case factors,
identifying their relative weights, and accounting for the simultaneous
presence of different factors," is the tool best suited to overcoming

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Hodge & Sachs, supra note 11, at 347; Thompson, supra note 11, at 1036;
Thompson, supra note 8, at 385.
48. McChesney, supra note 34, at 515 n.82 ("Thompson is aware of the
methodological shortcomings of merely sorting cases, and reports that he is at work on a
multiple regression model for the veil-piercing cases."). McChesney's citation is to
footnote 62 of Thompson's original article, where Thompson states:
In an additional article in progress, I use this data and a logit analysis, a form of
statistical regression analysis, to test the relationship between a dependent
variable, here the court's decision to pierce the veil, and independent variables
here the various factors recorded in the data set. Not surprisingly, the
"conclusory" indicators of alter ego and instrumentality are the factors most
closely associated with a piercing result. The explanation of that model and the
results are left for another day.
Thompson, supra note 11, at 1046 n.62. Although Thompson recognized the need for a
more sophisticated "logit analysis, a form of statistical regression analysis," the supposed
"model and the results" have never been reported. Id.
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these limitations.49 It is for this reason that this Article undertakes
just such an analysis.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION

A.

Objectives and Hypotheses

This study has two primary objectives. The initial goal is to
statistically describe the propensities of modern courts for piercing
the corporate veil in the parent-subsidiary situation. This is the first
study to document these judicial proclivities. In connection with
these descriptive statistics, it is important to explore whether
differences in piercing results, such as the level of piercing in
corporate group cases as compared to all piercing cases, are
statistically significant according to accepted quantitative measures of
statistical analysis. The second aim of this study is to move beyond
descriptive statistics and explore potential causal relationships
regarding piercing the veil in the parent-subsidiary context. Thus, the
study is designed to test the following major hypotheses involving
piercing in corporate groups:
1. Piercing occurs with the same frequency in the parentsubsidiary situation as in the overall universe of piercing
decisions.
2. Piercing occurs with relatively equal frequency in the
parent-subsidiary context irrespective of the level of court
making the determination.
3. Piercing occurs with relatively equal frequency in the
parent-subsidiary context irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
an individual or an entity.
4. Piercing occurs with relatively equal frequency in the
parent-subsidiary context in tort cases and in contract cases.

49. McChesney, supra note 34, at 519. "Indeed, as Franklin Fisher has observed, it is
difficult to see how anyone could reach legal conclusions in proceedings involving largesample, multivariable situations without resort to multiple regression." Id. at 519-20
(citing Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings,80 COLUM. L. REV.
702, 730 (1980)).
See generally Michael 0. Finklestein, Regression Models in
Administrative Proceedings,86 HARV. L. REV. 1442 (1972) (addressing the use of multiple
regression analysis in administrative proceedings); Daniel M. Rubinfield, Econometrics in
the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (1985) (addressing the use of multiple regression
analysis in court proceedings).
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5. The decision to pierce in the parent-subsidiary context is
not significantly influenced by a finding of fraud or
misrepresentation.
6. The decision to pierce in the parent-subsidiary context is
not significantly influenced by a finding of parent
control/dominance.
7. The decision to pierce in the parent-subsidiary context is
not significantly influenced by a finding of overlap between the
parent and subsidiary."
8. The factor of parental control/dominance is a conclusory
term that incorporates other factors in its determination.
B.

Data Collection

Unlike prior studies, this study purports to create a record of
every piercing case during the effective period. Thus, the data for
this study includes both reported and unreported cases in Westlaw
and Lexis captured by the searches detailed below. Every effort was
made to include only the final decision for a particular case.
Over 4,000 distinct cases resulted from the various searches on
Westlaw and Lexis. The study used both Westlaw and Lexis in order
to collect all relevant cases regarding piercing the corporate veil. 2
50. Overlap between the parent and subsidiary includes: common activities; persons;
places such as common offices; common business activities; and common employees,
including directors and officers.
51. The period used for the searches was January 1, 1990, through March 1, 2008, with
the desire to capture what the courts have been doing recently in this area. Thompson
only considered reported cases. Thompson, supra note 11, at 1046. The Hodge and Sachs
update noted that:
Even more so than Professor Thompson's study, this [Hodge and Sachs] Study
does not purport to create a record of every piercing case during the effective
period. Nor does it attempt to draw any conclusions about the numbers of cases in
which piercing the corporate veil is litigated. The data set for this Study is limited
in many respects. It only includes cases reported in Westlaw. Thus, it does not
include any cases that were settled or cases that were unreported. It may include
decisions of both the trial and appellate courts for the same case. These variables
may or may not result in a selection bias that prevents the data set from being
representative of the totality of piercing disputes.
Hodge & Sachs, supra note 11, at 348-49. Of course, any study that uses litigated casesboth reported and unreported-is subject to the limitations inherent in relying on
circumstances where the parties have seen fit not only to resort to litigation but have
proceeded with that litigation to a point of some manner of judicial resolution.
52. Although this Article speaks in terms of piercing the corporate veil, some cases
included did not exclusively involve corporate entities. There are a very few cases, for
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The searches were conducted such that both state and federal cases
would be captured. Duplicative cases were removed using the case
cite. Where the same case appeared in several reported decisions,
only the decision of the highest court hearing the case that reached a
conclusive decision on the merits of the piercing claim was included.
While some of the search results returned duplicative cases,
many of the searches provided distinct cases the other searches did
not provide. Searches utilizing both terms/connectors and key
numbers were included so as not to rely solely upon the
categorization services of Westlaw and Lexis. These searches used a
more flexible terminology than previous studies and did not require
the specific term "corporate veil" for the case to be included. 3
Modern courts may not use the term "corporate veil" and will simply
refer to the doctrine as "piercing the veil," or they may dispense with
piercing terminology altogether, as in situations where enterprise
liability may be imposed.
1. Searches
The following searches were conducted in Westlaw:
1.

PIERC! & VEIL! & SUBSID! PARENT! WHOLLY

2.

SY, DI(pierc! /5 "corporate veil")

3.

topic (101) /p pierc! /5 "corporate veil"

4.

101kl.3

5.

101kl.4

6.

101kl.5

7.

101kl.6

8.

101kl.7

example, involving parent-subsidiary relationships where one of the entities is a limited
liability company. These cases were included if they met the other criteria.
53. This is an additional critique of the original Thompson study as it relates to the
sample selection. The Thompson study claimed to include the entire population of
piercing cases. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 1044 (stating that the project included all
Westlaw "piercing the veil" cases through 1985). Yet, the Swain and Aguilar study found
265 cases involving jurisdictional piercing, while the Thompson study only found 153
during the comparable period. Swain & Aguilar, supra note 29, at 460-61. The likely
reason for this apparent lack of completeness is the limited search terms that Thompson
used. In his study, Thompson used the search terms "piercing the corporate veil" and
"disregard! the corporate entity" and only four Westlaw key numbers-all in Westlaw
only. Thompson, supra note 11, at 1036 n.1, 1044 n.47.
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Search 1 produced all cases in which the terms pierc! and veil! as well
as either subsid!, parent!, or wholly can be found. Search 2 was
utilized to catch all cases that mention piercing the corporate veil.
Search 3 was used to capture all cases labeled under Westlaw key
number 101 (corporations) that mention piercing the corporate veil.
Searches 4-8 are more specific key number searches, which disregard
precise language, with the key numbers standing for specific issues
addressed in the cases instead. Within category 101 (corporations):
key number 1.3 searched for those cases addressing "distinct entity in
general, corporation as"; key number 1.4 searched for those cases
addressing "disregarding the corporate entity"; 1.5 searched those
cases addressing "separate corporations, disregarding separate
entities"; 1.6 searched those cases addressing "particular occasions for
determining corporate entity"; 1.7 searched those cases ' addressing
"pleading and procedure for determining corporate entity. 54
2. Parent-Subsidiary Database
Of the over 4,000 cases identified by the searches, 618 of those
cases involved parent-subsidiary piercing. Each of the over 4,000
cases were reviewed by a coder for the parent-subsidiary
classification. Therefore, even cases not using the specific "parent" or
"subsidiary" terminology were included in the parent-subsidiary
database if appropriate. Of the parent-subsidiary cases identified, the
current analysis of substantive parent-subsidiary piercing results
identified 360 cases for final inclusion. As a result, and as explained
next, 258 cases were excluded from the analysis because they: (1)
failed to reach the merits of the piercing issue; (2) had a special
statutory test for piercing; (3) involved jurisdictional or venue
piercing; (4) involved horizontal piercing; or (5) involved reverse
piercing.
Cases that failed to reach the merits of the piercing issue were
excluded for the obvious reason of not being a final adjudication on
the merits. Cases that used a special statutory liability test (such as
"control" under federal securities laws) were excluded, as these tests
did not apply the common law piercing test.55
54. The following search was conducted in the "LN-Summary" segment of the cases
in LexisNexis: (pierc! /5 veil! parent! subsid! or whol!). This search looked for cases that
contain pierc! within five words of veil! and that also contain parent! or subsid! or whol!.
The database also contained an additional initial search: pierce and corporate veil and
(alter ego or instrumentality).
55. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2006) (providing for liability of "controlling persons"
under the Securities Exchange Act). These cases are brought pursuant to a specific state
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Jurisdictional cases were also excluded. Piercing in these cases is

not a question of the ultimate liability of the parent but rather
whether the parent can be made a part of the current lawsuit-that is,
whether jurisdiction can be exercised over the parent as a matter
preliminary to any adjudication of piercing or ultimate liability. It is
generally acknowledged that the courts tend to apply a different and
more expansive approach for those jurisdictional situations.56
Horizontal piercing involves piercing between two corporations,
both of which are subsidiaries of the same parent corporation. Cases
involving these so-called brother/sister corporations were also
excluded, so as only to include vertical liability in parent-subsidiary
cases. Reverse piercing cases, where the owners or shareholders of
or federal statutory provision. Cases that applied a separate special statutory test (such as
direct liability under CERCLA) were excluded, as these tests are different from the
common law piercing test. See generally Cindy A. Schipani, The Changing Face of Parent
and Subsidiary Corporations: Enterprise Theory and Federal Regulation, 37 CONN. L.
REV. 691 (2005) (examining the special tests employed by the courts under CERCLA and
ERISA). Cases were included where they involved a statutorily-based civil claim and
applied the common law piercing test. For example, when bankruptcy cases used a federal
common law piercing test, they were included. See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d
195, 205-07 (3d Cir. 2007) (comparing common law parent-subsidiary piercing with the
special concept of "substantive consolidation" under the federal bankruptcy laws); see also
NLRB v. Bolivar-Tees, Inc., 551 F.3d 722, 728 n.4 (8th Cir. 2008) (comparing federal
common law piercing with the separate "single employer doctrine" and alter ego analysis
under the National Labor Relations Act). The Court in Bolivar-Tees explained:
Although the term "alter ego" is commonly employed in the context with piercing
of the corporate veil, a distinct "alter ego doctrine" has developed under the
NLRA, which "involves a more lenient standard for disregarding the corporate
form than that employed in corporate law." Greater Kan. City Laborers Pension
Fund v. Super. Gen. Contractors,Inc., 104 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir.1997) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). The NLRB's "alter ego doctrine focuses on
whether one business entity should be held to the labor obligations of another
business entity that has discontinued operations." Iowa Express [v. Nat'l Labor
Relations Bd., 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir. 1984)]. However, piercing of the
corporate veil to attach liability to a shareholder is a doctrine of corporate law and
is distinct from the alter ego doctrine developed under the NLRA. See [United
States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-63 (1998)]; [Minnesota Laborers Health &
Welfare Fund v. Scanlan, 360 F.3d 925, 927-28 (8th Cir. 2004)].
Id. (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., D. Klein & Son, Inc. v. Good Decision, Inc., 147 Fed. App'x. 195, 196 (2d
Cir. 2005) ("[T]he exercise of personal jurisdiction over an alleged alter ego ... requires
application of a 'less onerous standard' than that necessary for equity to pierce the
corporate veil for liability purposes under New York law."). These cases were the focus of
Swain and Aguilar's study. Swain & Aguilar, supra note 29, at 445. Thompson found that,
in cases involving piercing the veil for jurisdictional purposes, the plaintiffs' success rate
was 36.8%. Thompson, supra note 11, at 1060. For venue purposes, however, Thompson
found that the plaintiffs' success rate was 58.3%, a higher piercing rate than in the
substantive veil piercing cases. See id.
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the corporation seek to have a court pierce the corporate veil for their
own benefit, were excluded due to the different nature of the claims.
3. Variables
The dependent variable for this study was whether or not the
court pierced the corporate veil. The cases were coded for potentially
twenty-five categorical independent variables. 7 These variables can
be separated under the following four headings: (1) type of case; (2)
piercing factors; (3) court information; and (4) party information. As
a simple record-keeping function, the following data was recorded for
each of the cases: whether or not the veil was pierced, the year, the
level of the court, 8 the jurisdiction hearing the case, the jurisdiction
of law applied, the identity of the party seeking the piercing, 9 and the
substance of the claim.60
Consideration of additional operative independent variables is

an important determination of the validity of any empirical study.
Therefore, the analytical factors that courts noted in their decisions of
whether to pierce the veil were specifically and meticulously
recorded.
This study took its independent variable factors from a

careful consideration and compilation of those factors regularly
identified by the courts informed by previous studies focusing on the
parent-subsidiary

context. 62

Factors

included

were:

57. The complete listing of variables and coding instructions that were followed is
available from the author.
58. Courts were placed in the following categories: District/Trial Court, Appellate
Intermediate Court, Supreme Court (Highest Court), and U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
59. Parties seeking to pierce the corporate veil were placed in the following
categories: Individual, Entity (corporations, LLCs, partnerships, etc.), and Unknown.
60. Substance of the claim included contract, tort, criminal, bankruptcy, and statutory
claims.
61. Note that the method for coding the factors is identical to the method used by
DiMatteo and Rich in their analysis of factors contributing to a finding of
unconscionability. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 43, at 1093-94.
62. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 8, at 386-87.
As in the prior study, the data-gathering form included a universe of
approximately 85 reasons used to describe piercing which had been gleaned from
previous research in the area and a sampling of cases in the data set. These
reasons were grouped into several major categories that described recurring
justifications for piercing the corporate veil. The nine larger categories were: (1)
undercapitalization; (2) failure to follow corporate formalities; (3) overlap of
corporate, records, functions or personnel; (4) shareholder domination; (5)
intertwining; (6) lack of substantive separation; (7) agency; (8) fraud or
misrepresentation; and (9) general conclusory terms such as instrumentality or
alter ego.
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"fraud/misrepresentation";63 "commingling of funds";' "undercapitalization"; 6 "overlap";' "directors/officers or corporate records

non-existent" ;67 "directors/officers non-functioning";' "unfairness/
injustice"; 69 "assumption of risk";7" and "parent control/dominance."7
If the court noted the lack of any of the piercing factors, this was
recorded. Similarly, if the court noted that multiple factors were
either present or lacking, this was recorded as well.72

63. Hodge & Sachs, supra note 11, at 348.
"Misrepresentation" included misrepresentation as to the corporation's assets and
financial condition, and misrepresentation as to the party responsible for payment.
Professor Thompson notes that, while this activity is often referred to by the court
as "fraud," many courts will find that the evidence supports a finding of
"misrepresentation" where a common law claim of fraud could not be established.
Id. (citing Thompson, supra note 11, at 1044 n.53).
64. These factors were noted where there was commingling of parent and subsidiary
funds, siphoning of funds by the parent, or treatment by the parent shareholder of
subsidiary funds as owned by the parent.
65. "Undercapitalization" includes both those cases where uncapitalization was
present at the subsidiary's inception and those where the subsidiary became
undercapitalized later. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 1044 n.50.
66. "Overlap" identifies common activities, persons, or places between the parent and
the subsidiary, such as common offices, common business activity, and common
employees, including directors and officers.
67. "Directors/officers or corporate records non-existent" identifies cases in which a
corporation never appointed some or all of its directors, officers, or other functionaries.
This factor was also noted where no corporate records, financial or otherwise, were
created at all.
68. "Directors/officers non-functioning" identifies cases in which a corporation
appointed directors and officers, but the directors or offices held meetings or otherwise
took formal action rarely, if ever. In other words, even though corporate functionaries
existed, the business was run informally without recognition of titles or roles.
69. Cases that involved "Unfairness/Injustice" were most often marked by a
statement, albeit a conclusory one, by the court.
70. "Assumption of Risk" identifies cases where the court determined that there was
an assumption of risk by the plaintiff such that the veil should not be pierced. Generally,
such cases included an explicit statement by the court.
71. "Parent control/dominance" identifies situations in which the parentlshareholder
is to be held liable and the veil is pierced because the parent exerted direct control over or
dominated the subsidiary company.
72. Potential inconsistencies in coding were reduced by having a stringent training
method with each researcher, who would receive several test cases to code. Upon
completion by the coder, the results were checked for completeness and correctness. Any
resulting discrepancies were identified, discussed, and clarified. Particular attention was
paid to the exclusionary factors and the graduations of the factors present (i.e., whether
the factor was explicitly present, explicitly not present, or not discussed.) Five percent of
the cases in the database were randomly spot-checked to ensure reliability. No significant
coding problems were discovered. The complete coding instructions followed and given to
research assistants are available from the author.
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III. PARENT-SUBSIDIARY PIERCING EMPIRICAL RESULTS

After presenting frequency distributions and cross-tabulations,
more rigorous statistical methods were applied to test the hypotheses
and to refine the tentative conclusions drawn from the descriptive
statistics.
A.

Frequency Distributionsand Cross-TabulationAnalysis
1. Initial Results and Comparisons

In this data set, the courts pierced the corporate veil in 20.56% of
the cases, as shown in Table 1. This value is considerably lower than
(approximately one-half of) Professor Thompson's original general
figure of 40.18%. 73 It is also considerably lower than a recent update
of Thompson's work by Hodge and Sachs-their figure was 35.3%
when looking at data from January 1, 1986, through December 31,
1995. 74 Thompson's later work, purporting to "focus on corporate
groups, '' 75 garnered a 34% figure. 76 This difference is substantial:
substantive piercing in the parent-subsidiary context occurs
approximately half as often as piercing does generally, and more than
one-third less often than the most comparable database explored by
other studies.
Table 1: Overall Piercing Results
Total Cases

Pierced

Not Pierced

Pierced (%)

360

74

286

20.56

Several factors may account for this marked difference, each of
which is instructive on its own. The most obvious explanation is that
parent-subsidiary cases present factual situations that the courts find
generally less favorable to piercing. The factors that often support
holding individual shareholders of a small business liable, such as
commingling of assets and failure to follow corporate formalities, may
simply appear less often in corporate group cases. Thus, it may be
that corporate shareholders follow rules better than individual ones.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Thompson, supra note 11, at 1048 tbl.1.
Hodge & Sachs, supra note 11, at 349.
Thompson, supra note 8, at 385.
Id. at 386.
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In addition, prior studies involving databases containing all
piercing cases are a jumble of various unrelated situations. They
included both traditional single entity piercing as well as corporate
group piercing. They also captured all forms of piercing, including
both more lenient jurisdictional cases as well as cases that do not truly
involve piercing, such as reverse piercing cases that provide benefits
to corporate owners, instead of holding them liable. As to the thirtyfour percent piercing figure from the nearest comparable database,
which represents a more than sixty-percent greater piercing result
than the current statistics, there are similar distinctions. That
database included jurisdictional, horizontal, and reverse piercing, not
just substantive piercing.
Moreover, parent-subsidiary piercing claims present a
fundamentally different analytical challenge for the courts than those
involving the typical small business that has only one or just a few
Parent-subsidiary piercing claims may
individual shareholders.
at both parent and subsidiary levels,
entities
large
involve relatively
each of which has an economic reality. This factor, combined with
the concept of the corporation as a separate legal person generally,
may create a form of reification for the entities in this context,
Moreover, as with other business litigation, the general intractability
of applying the piercing doctrine within corporate groups may present
its own juridical obstacles. For many judges, the attempt to sort out
the corporate relationships and equities may fall into the "too hard"
pile.
Nevertheless, the bottom line is clear: courts are significantly
less likely to hold parent companies liable for the acts of their
subsidiaries than they are to pierce in other contexts. The twenty
percent piercing results are a far cry from the call for expanded
parent-subsidiary piercing by law and economics scholars such as
Easterbrook and Fischel. The results also belie the claims by
enterprise liability proponents that courts are more readily viewing
this area as one involving corporate groups rather than distinct
corporate entities.
Related to how often courts pierce is the question of whether the
propensity to pierce has changed over time. Table 2 presents this
data in two formats. First is the raw year-to-year data in both
Admittedly, the percentages
absolute and percentage terms.
with no easily discernable
to
year
from
year
substantially
fluctuate
trend. In comparison, Professor Thompson found no trend over time
and noted that, while the percentage of cases where the veil was
pierced varied from year to year, the value had remained relatively
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constant over several prior decades.77 Thus, Thompson concluded
that there was no trend toward increased veil piercing.7 8 Second, to
get a better sense of movement over time, the average for each of the
previous three years is calculated, showing what appears to be a
slightly increasing reluctance of courts to pierce the corporate veil.79
In any event, a pattern of increasing piercing over time does not
appear to exist.
Table 2: Piercing Rates over Time
Year

Total Cases Pierced Not Pierced

Pierced

Average Piercing for
Previous Three

Years (%)

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Total

21
15
20
21
27
20
6
17
25
22
28
25
29
23
21
9
16
13
2
360

5
2
7
6
7
3
0
5
3
6
3
5
7
3
5
2
5
0
0
74

16
13

23.81
13.33

13
15
20
17
6
12
22
16
25
20
22
20
16
7
11
13
2
286

35.00
28.57
25.93
15.00
0.00
29.41
12.00
27.27
10.71
20.00
24.14
13.04
23.81
22.22
31.25
0.00
0.00
20.56

25.00
26.79
29.41
23.53
18.87
18.60
16.67
21.88
16.00
18.67
18.29
19.48
20.55
18.87
26.09
18.42
16.13

77. Thompson, supra note 11, at 1048-49.
78. Id. at 1048.
79. This is consistent with Hodge and Sachs's conclusion that the courts were showing
an increasing reluctance to pierce the corporate veil. Hodge & Sachs, supra note 11, at
349-50.
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Table 3 shows that federal courts pierce at approximately the
same rate as state courts. This is consistent with the conclusions of
the prior case-counting studies.80
Table 3: Piercing by Jurisdiction
Tot

Federal
Courts
State
Courts

Total
CasesPierced
Cases
Pierced

Not

Pierced

Thompson s

Hodge &

(%)

Results
(%)

Results
%

187

51.9

39

148

20.9

41.4

38.3

173

48.1

35

138

20.2

39.3

31.0

Table 4 shows substantial differences in piercing among the
various court levels. State supreme courts pierced at nearly twice the
rate of the district/trial courts.8 This difference between trial courts
80. Professor Thompson found that state courts pierced at a similar but slightly lower
rate than federal courts. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 1049 tbl.3. Hodge and Sachs's
recent study supported the theory that federal courts pierced the veil more often than
state courts. See Hodge & Sachs, supra note 11, at 350 tbl.3. In comparison to this study,
the Thompson numbers and Hodge and Sachs's numbers reflect a study of all piercing
cases, not just parent-subsidiary cases, so it is interesting to note the differences between
the findings.
81. This conclusion is contrary to the conclusion of Professor Thompson that "[t]rial,
appellate and supreme courts pierce in a similar percentage of cases." Thompson, supra
note 11, at 1049. The differences between the piercing rates in Table 4 could be
considered marginally significant. The chi-square (X2) test is the standard method of
testing for an association between variables in this context-that is, to examine whether
two variables are independent or not. What does it mean to be independent, in this sense?
It means that the two factors are not related. More generally, a variable Y is "not
correlated with" or "independent of" the variable X if more of one is not associated with
more of another. If two categorical variables are correlated, their values tend to move
together, either in the same or opposite direction. The significance of the association is
partly a factor of the degrees of freedom (d.f.) in the Table, with degrees of freedom
calculated as (row-i) (column-i). The statistical significance associated with the cross-tab
of data presented in Table 4 equals ' =7.343, d.f.=3, and p=0.062. A low probability (p)
factor effectively equates with the expectation that the results would occur by chance.
Here, the results in the table would occur by chance in sixty-two out of 1,000 similar
samples. The probability value of 0.062 does not demonstrate statistical significance at the
conventional 0.05 level of confidence. Therefore, the hypothesis that the decision to
pierce is not related to the level of court making the determination cannot be rejected.
While the probability value of 0.062 does not quite reach the conventional level of
confidence, this result could be seen as marginally statistically significant. In sharp
contrast, Professor Thompson found that state trial, appellate, and supreme courts all
pierced in relatively the same percentage of cases. Note, however, that the chi-square test
is a test of association only and does not indicate which variable is the dependent variable
or independent variable, nor does the test reveal any information on the strength of the
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and appellate courts could be caused by, among other things, (1) a
decreased willingness among trial courts to pierce in comparison to
appellate courts; and/or (2) the probability that weaker piercing cases
are less likely to be appealed. Piercing is generally regarded as an
extraordinary remedy, and trial judges loathe being overturned.
Thus, trial judges may be more conservative when deciding to pierce
the corporate veil than appellate judges. It is also true that cases with
a low perceived chance of success on appeal are less likely to be
appealed, thereby weeding out weak cases and increasing the
percentage of cases in which the appellate courts pierce.
Table 4: Piercing by Court Level

Supreme
Court
(Highest

20

5.6

6

14

30.0

42.1

23.5

Court)

The percentage of cases in which courts pierce the veil varies
from state to state, as shown in Table 5. Among the jurisdictions with
the most piercing decisions, the percentage of cases in which courts
pierced ranged from 0% in Pennsylvania and 6.7% in Delaware to
27.3% in California and Florida. New York, as one of the country's
leading commercial centers, produced the most piercing cases. The
New York piercing percentage of 21% was substantially above the
national average of 20.56%. Delaware, the most dominant state in
corporate law, had the highest number of piercing cases behind
federal common law, New York, and Texas. However, at 6.7%,
Delaware by far had the lowest piercing percentage within this group,
with only one out of fifteen cases ultimately resulting in piercing.
This fact may reflect the larger size of Delaware corporations as well
relationship. For a discussion of the strength and direction of the relationships, see the
discussion of the logistic regression analysis in Part IV.B, infra.
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as a general pro-business predilection in that jurisdiction. The
differences between the states were not statistically significant due to
the small number of cases in each jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not
possible to say with statistical certainty that these results are due to
different views regarding piercing the corporate veil, although that is
the clear implication.

Table 5: Differences by State

Alabama

425.0

64.71

Arizona
California

11

8

3

Connecticut
Col(1mbia
Delaware
icderal
comiioii Law
Florida
1
Georg'ia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Iniasla
Iowa

0.0

41.18

31

27.3

44.94

1.9

28.6

63.64

0
15

14

0
1

0.0
4.

67
11
6

51
8
6

16
3
o

18.6
3.1
1.7

1

9
3
0

1
3
3
425.0
5

n~a~

1
3

0.6
0.3
3.
(0.8

Loolsian~

6
2[1d

Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri
Mvisiippi
Mollan
11Nebraska

1

Michigati~91
825.0
3
41

__

_

50.0
0.H6)6
23.1
0.0

25.00
42.31

.7

.6

23.1

40.00

1.4

2

4

10

3

1

9011
41.30
38.30I

1-7
0.6

2

2

23.9)
27.3
0.0

40.0
0.0
6.
50.0

3

1

00
60.00

-

58.33
79
26.67
58
25.00

Kentucky
Maine

6.7

-0.0

2.508
1.

11-

72

33.3 :
25031

38.46
40.00

50.0

58.33

000.5.0

82. Thompson, supra note 11, at 1051 tbl.6. It was assumed that the state coded HA
by Thompson was Hawaii. It should be noted again that Thompson's data included all
piercing cases not just parent-subsidiary cases.
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Hmhie0
New Mexico

0

0

0

00

0.0

0.00

0

0

.0

0.0

15.38

0.0

42.86

1.9

14.3

57.14

6

0.0

56.25

North Carolina

Ohio

7

Oregon

2
-

-,2-

1 Al

l~1-1y
a1a
PuertoRico

20.0
-i

South Carolina

[Vol. 87

0.00
-

n

i

n

30-0

37.50

(I'~~

Suth Dakota,
Tennessee
Utah

40.0

38.89

0.0

42.86

16.7

25.00

0.0

42.86

0.0

62.50

IPI)~~TI~

Vermiont
Virginia
West Virginia

.
1y n

1

0

00

Knowledge of differences between states is useful only in
situations in which parties to litigation can predict and choose which
state's law will be applied. Potential defendants can choose the state
of incorporation. Those who have chosen a restrictive piercing
jurisdiction would argue that a court should apply the "internal
affairs" rule and the laws of the state of incorporation to the piercing
decision.
Knowledge of the differences between state approaches
will be of greater use to prospective plaintiffs who would rather file in
a state that is more likely to pierce or a state that does not
automatically apply the law of the state of incorporation to that
determination.

83. See, e.g., Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d
371, 378 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying the internal affairs doctrine to choice of law decision on
piercing the corporate veil in parent-subsidiary situation).
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2. Piercing Factors Analysis
In considering the piercing decision in the parent-subsidiary
situation, courts explicitly consider a number of individual variables
or factors. In addition, there are other variables-such as who brings
the piercing claim or whether the piercing claim arises in a contract or
tort situation-which are not explicitly discussed but which affect a
court's decision to pierce. The following tables explore both types of
factors, with the unattributed variables considered first.
Table 6 shows that courts were more likely to pierce for entity
and corporate plaintiffs than they were for individual plaintiffs, at
least with regard to parent-subsidiary piercing claims. The difference
between the treatment of piercing cases involving individual plaintiffs
and those brought by entity plaintiffs was statistically significant. 4 In
contrast, Professor Thompson's data revealed no significant
difference between individual and corporate plaintiffs. 5 Hodge and
Sachs's results were consistent with Thompson's. s6
Table 6: Individual vs. Corporate Plaintiffs

Individual
Entity!
Cor oration 8 7

165
o
195

20
54

I

145
ld
141

12.12
o
27.69

37.70

32.35

36.81

33.66

Although this study does not show the reasons for the variation
between cases brought by individual plaintiffs as compared to entity
plaintiffs, several factors might be considered. Tort claims are
brought more often by individuals, and tort claims, as will be
demonstrated shortly, are the least successful type of piercing
claims.8 8 It may be that most tort claims against businesses are
covered by insurance and that only the most controverted and/or
84. The results of the chi-square test for Table 6 are: X2=13.270, d.f.=1, p < 0.001. The
lower the probability (p), the less likely it is that the results obtained in any given table
occurred by chance. Here, the results in Table 6 would occur by chance in less than 1 out
of 1,000 similar samples. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that the decision to
pierce is not related to whether the plaintiff is an individual or an entity.
85. Thompson, supranote 11, at 1050.
86. Hodge & Sachs, supra note 11, at 353.
87. The Entity/Corporation category includes corporations, LLCs, partnerships, etc.
88. See infra Tables 7, 8.
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potentially remunerative are litigated, resulting in a lower success
rate. In addition, the quality of legal representation for entities may
generally be higher than for individuals. This may be due to the
relatively greater litigation resources available to entities to deal with
the complex issues presented in piercing cases, such as proving that
management is non-functioning or that a subsidiary is dominated by
the parent. The quality of the representation also could affect both
the decision to seek piercing and the effectiveness of the presentation
to the court once that decision has been made.
Table 7: Underlying Cause of Action

Cnrc530551628.80

36

sulotc
13
Criminal

2

0.61

47

91
1

7.41

7(4t

50.00

Table 7 breaks cases down by underlying cause of action and
shows that courts pierce more often in contract cases than in tort
cases. This difference is statistically significant. 9° This finding is
consistent with what is arguably Professor Thompson's most
controversial finding-that courts pierced more often in contract
cases than in tort cases. 91
89. Cases that used a special statutory test were excluded. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
90. The results of the chi-square test for Table 7 relating to tort claims are: X'=13.883,
d.f.=l, p < 0.001. The lower the probability (p), the less likely it is that the results obtained
in any given table occurred by chance. Here, the results in Table 7 would occur by chance
in less than 1 out of 1000 similar samples. The results of the chi-square test for Table 7
relating to contract claims are: X=15.004, d.f.=l, p < 0.001. Therefore, we can reject the
hypothesis that the decision to pierce is not related to the nature of the claim. Because
these descriptive statistics suggest a connection between the type of case and piercing, they
will be revisited in the regression analysis below.
91. Thompson, supra note 11, at 1058. The conventional wisdom at the time of
Professor Thompson's study was that the involuntary nature of tort cases would lead to a
higher percentage of piercing compared to contractual disputes in which the plaintiffs
voluntarily chose to deal with the corporation. Id. at 1058 & n.118. Professor Thompson,
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Table 8: Type of Plaintiff (it) and Underlying Cause of Action

CrmiI

Tot127

2:1

89

5.00

1

50.00

70.08

38

29.92

Table 8 shows that individuals brought 70.08% of the tort cases
in the piercing dataset, but only 28.27% of the contract claims.
Entities brought only 29.92% of the tort cases and 71.73% of the
contract claims. Thus, a connection between the type of plaintiff and
the type of case exists, which may also assist in understanding the
disparate results between tort and contract piercing claims.
Beyond differences based on who brings the underlying cause of
action, there is the more central issue of what factors the courts
explicitly identify as relevant to their piercing determinations in the
parent-subsidiary context.
Table 9 identifies nine individual
categories of factors and how often they arise in piercing cases.
however, found that courts pierced the corporate veil in almost 42% of contract cases but
in less than 31% of tort cases. Id. at 1058 tbl.9. Professor Thompson's data identified 779
contract cases and 226 tort cases. Id. The current study found 191 contract cases (53.06%
of the total cases) and 127 tort cases (35.28% of the total cases), which becomes 834 and
555, respectively, when the sample rate is extrapolated to Professor Thompson's sample
size of 1,572. See id. On their face, these results disprove the hypothesis that courts are
more likely to pierce in tort cases, as opposed to contract cases. In fact, these results
suggest the opposite is true-courts are more likely to pierce in order to impose liability
for a contract claim than they are for a tort claim. Id.
This data included two criminal piercing cases. This finding is probably not
significant. In Professor Thompson's pre-1986 study, there were only fifteen criminal
cases out of a total of 1,572 cases. Id. The rate of piercing in Table 5 in statute-based
cases is substantially different from Thompson's analysis with pre-1986 data, where 35%
of the total cases were statutory; the current study found only 7.5% of the total cases to be
statutory. Id. It should be noted that Thompson's study included procedural and venue
piercing cases, which were explicitly excluded from this study, as well as cases in which a
statute created a separate test for liability in addition to common-law piercing. See id. at
1059-62.
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Table 9: Presence of Specific Factors in Decisions to Pierce

Parent
Control &
Dominance

VUt

Present
Not
Discussed

Not
Fraud/
Misrepresentation
Msersnain

Present
Peet
Present

Overlap

Not
Discussed
Not
Present

Commingling of
Funds

Present
Not
Discussed
Not
Present
Present

Undercapitalization
(During start-up &
ongoing business)

Unfairness/Injustice

Nonexistent

Non-functioning

Assumption of Risk

142

Present

Not
Discussed
Not
Present
Present
Not
Discussed
Not
Present
Present
Not
Discussed
Not
Present
Present
Not
Discussed
Not
Present
Present
Not
Discussed
Not
Present
Present
Not
discussed

1

31

39.4

611

16.9

157 1

43.6

141
2
26

39.2
7.2

193

111

97.9

50

18,0

82.0

21

86.6

129
2

12
24

91.5

8.5

7.7

92.3

53.6

155

38

80.3

19.7

56

15.6

52

4

92,9

7.1

98

27.2

51

47

52.0

48.0

206

57.2

183

23

88,8

11.2

73

20.3

70

3

95.9

4.1

56

15.6

14

42

25.0

75.0

231

64.2

2(12

29

87.4

12.6

71
44

19,7
12.2

68
13

3
31

95.8
29.5

4.2
70.5

245

68.1

2(15

40

83.7

16.3

84
27

23.3
7.5

80
2

4

95.2

4.8

25

7.4

92.6

249

69,2

204

45

81.9

18.1

68

18.9

60

8

88.2

11.8

16

4.

4

12

25.0

75.0

276

76.7

222

54

80,4

19.6

79
23

21.9
6.4

70
5

9

88.6

11.4

18

21.7

78.3

258

71.7

211

47

81.8

18.2

11
2

3.1

8

3

72.7

27.3

0.6

1

1

50.0

50.0

347

96.4

278

69

80.1

19.9
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Parent Control/Dominance

Dominance is the most frequently addressed issue in piercing
cases. For purposes of this study, this category addresses situations in
which the court determined that the parent exerted extraordinary
control over the subsidiary company or dominated it. In cases where
the courts determined that control or dominance was present,
piercing occurred 82.0% (n=50) of the time. Courts found that
dominance was not present in 39.4% (n=142) of the cases. In cases
where the court determined that dominance was not present, piercing
occurred only 2.1%(n=3) of the time.' That is, if no control or
dominance was found, the courts almost literally refused to pierce the
corporate veil, absolving the parent from liability in 97.9% of the
cases.
The difference in piercing the veil when parent
control/dominance was present, not present, or not mentioned was
statistically significant.93
It is especially interesting to note that courts found parental
control or dominance to be present less than 17% (16.9% (n=61)) of
the time. As a simple matter of first appearances, this infrequent
judicial finding of control or dominance seems counterintuitive. A
parent who owns 100% of the shares of a subsidiary company
admittedly "controls" and "dominates" the subsidiary in any usual
sense of those terms. The parent, as sole shareholder, elects the
board of directors of the subsidiary (and can remove any of those
directors), which is the policy-making organ of the corporation. The
chosen board then selects the subsidiary's officers and managers. The
parent initiates, directly or through the board, and must as
shareholder approve any fundamental corporate or policy changes in
the subsidiary's operations. The parent is the sole beneficiary of the
productivity and profits of the subsidiary's operating results. This is
control or dominance in the normal sense of those terms and exists
automatically and tautologically in the parent-subsidiary situation.
As a matter of piercing jurisprudence, then, the parental control
or dominance necessary to pierce the subsidiary's corporate veil must
92. In cases where the courts did not discuss dominance, piercing occurred 13.4%
(n=21) of the time. Since this is somewhat lower than the mean level of piercing, the
choice to discuss dominance increases the likelihood that a court will ultimately pierce.
93. The results of the chi-square test for piercing and the parent control/dominance
factor are: x'=175.409, d.f.=2, p < 0.001. The lower the probability (p), the less likely it is
that the results obtained in any given table occurred by chance. Here, the results in the
table would occur by chance in fewer than 1 out of 1,000 similar samples. Therefore, we
can reject the hypothesis that the decision to pierce is not related to a finding of control or
domination.
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take on a different meaning, since courts find it to exist relatively
rarely. This seems to be the attitude of the courts as well. As the
Supreme Court has stated:
It is a general principle of corporate law deeply "ingrained in
our economic and legal systems" that a parent corporation (socalled because of control through ownership of another
corporation's stock) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries
.... Thus it is hornbook law that "the exercise of the 'control'
which stock ownership gives to the stockholders ... will not
create liability beyond the assets of the subsidiary. That
'control' includes the election of directors, the making of bylaws ... and the doing of all other acts incident to the legal
status of stockholders. Nor will a duplication of some or all of
the directors or executive officers be fatal."94
Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, some commentators have
called for expanded or unlimited parental liability based on the single
factor of extraordinary control or domination alone.95 They point for
support to cases such as Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Diners
Club International,Inc. ,96 where the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit pierced the corporate veil of Carte Blanche International,
Ltd., to hold its parent company, Diners Club International, Inc.,
liable for an arbitration award. 7 While the result itself was not
remarkable, language in the case caused commentators to argue that
"the traditional 'three-factor' doctrine has presented so many
problems that some courts such as the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit have abandoned it entirely and have adopted 'singlefactor piercing' as governing law for 'piercing' cases."98
It appears that this report of the demise of the traditional parentsubsidiary piercing doctrine was quite premature. The Second Circuit

94. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61-62 (1998) (quoting William 0.
Douglas & Carroll M. Shanks, Insulationfrom Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations,
39 YALE L.J. 193, 193-96 (1929)). The Court went on to say:
But there is an equally fundamental principle of corporate law, applicable to the
parent-subsidiary relationship as well as generally, that the corporate veil may be
pierced and the shareholder held liable for the corporation's conduct when, inter
alia, the corporate form would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain
wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholder's behalf.
Id. at 62.
95. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
96. 2 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1993).
97. Id. at 26.
98. Blumberg, Transformation,supra note 7, at 612.
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later clarified its position in Freeman v. Complex Computing Co.99 In
that case, the court began by generally noting that it will only pierce
the corporate veil in "certain limited circumstances," and that liability
"may be predicated upon either a showing of fraud or complete
control by the dominating [entity] that leads to a wrong against
parties.""' The court then reaffirmed the traditional three-pronged
test, stating:
[T]o pierce the corporate veil under New York law, a plaintiff
must prove that "(1) [the owner] ha[s] exercised such control
that the [corporation] has become a mere instrumentality of the
[owner], which is the real actor; (2) such control has been used
to commit a fraud or other wrong; and (3) the fraud or wrong
results in an unjust loss or injury to plaintiff." ' 1
The court reiterated that a mere finding of dominance or control,
without more, does not satisfy all three elements of the traditional
test. It squared that proposition with its previous position in Carte
Blanche, explaining:
To the extent that we have restated this test in cases such as
[Carte Blanche], in which we stated that veil-piercing will be
allowed "in two broad situations: to prevent fraud or other
wrong, or where a parent dominates and controls a subsidiary,"
the element of domination and control never was considered to
be sufficient of itself to justify the piercing of a corporate veil.
Unless the control is utilized to perpetrate a fraud or other
wrong, limited liability will prevail."
Thus, despite calls to abandon the traditional three-pronged test,
courts have refused to adopt unlimited parental liability based solely
on extraordinary control or domination.
99. 119 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1997).
100. Id. at 1052.
101. Id. at 1053.
102. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick
Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1991)). The court went on to explain:
[E]ven if a plaintiff showed that the dominator of a corporation had complete
control over the corporation so that the corporation "had no separate mind, will,
or existence of its own," New York law will not allow the corporate veil to be
pierced in the absence of a showing that this control "was used to commit wrong,
fraud, or the breach of a legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in contravention
of plaintiff's legal rights, and that the control and breach of duty proximately
caused the injury complained of."
Id. (quoting Elec. Switching Indus., Inc. v. Faradyne Elec. Corp., 833 F.2d 418, 424 (2d Cir.
1987)).
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Whatever the vagary of this extraordinary control or
domination determination, 1 3 the current inquiry explores what
happens when these factors are found to exist. The results strongly
suggest that extraordinary control or dominance is an integral part of
a court's decision whether or not to pierce the corporate veil. Note
that only three courts in the survey pierced the corporate veil after
finding that dominance was not present and only eleven courts were
willing to forego piercing when they determined that extraordinary
control or dominance was present.'O°
b.

Fraud/Misrepresentation

Fraud or misrepresentation is the second most frequently
addressed issue in piercing cases.
In this context, fraud or
misrepresentation has taken on a variety of forms, ranging from
traditional fraud, in which the subsidiary "affirmatively, intentionally,
and calculatedly led [plaintiff] to believe it was [parent],"' 0 5 to the
more circuitous situation in which "plaintiff's allegation that [parent]
created a network of subsidiary corporations for the purpose of
avoiding federal regulation [was] sufficient to establish the fraud or
wrong requirement."10 6
Fraud or misrepresentation was discussed in 46.4% (n=167) of

the piercing cases. Courts found fraud to be present in 7.2% (n=26)
103. When viewed as part of the piercing analysis based on domination, factors
indicating that the subsidiary corporation is the mere alter ego of another corporation
have been stated by one court to be:
1) the absence of the formalities and paraphernalia that are part and parcel of the
corporate existence, i.e. issuance of stock, election of directors, keeping of
corporate records and the like, (2) inadequate capitalization, (3) whether funds are
put in and taken out of the corporation for personal rather than corporate
purposes, (4) overlap in ownership, officers, directors, and personnel, (5) common
office space, address and telephone numbers of corporate entities, (6) the amount
of business discretion displayed by the allegedly dominated corporation, (7)
whether the related corporations deal with the dominated corporation at arms [sic]
length, (8) whether the corporations are treated as independent profit centers, (9)
the payment or guarantee of debts of the dominated corporation by other
corporations in the group, and (10) whether the corporation in question had
property that was used by other of the corporations as if it were its own.
Wm. Passalacqua Builders, 933 F.2d at 138-39 (finding that the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil and the "alter ego theory" are indistinguishable and "should be treated as
interchangeable").
104. Since these results support the hypothesis that dominance affects a court's
decision whether to pierce, they will be revisited in the regression analysis below.
105. OTR Assoc. v. IBC Servs., Inc., 801 A.2d 407, 410 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002).
106. Campo v. 1st Nationwide Bank, 857 F. Supp. 264, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).

2009]

MODERN LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS

1129

of the cases. In cases in which the courts determined that fraud was
present, piercing occurred 92.3% (n=24) of the time. Where fraud
was present, courts refused to pierce 7.7% (n=2) of the time. Courts
found that fraud was not present in 39.2% (n=141) of the cases. In
cases in which the court determined that fraud was not present,
piercing occurred 8.5% (n=12) of the time. Thus, where fraud was
not present, courts declined to pierce 91.5% (n=129) of the time.
Where the court did not discuss fraud, it pierced 19.7% (n=38) of the
time, which is nearly identical to the mean rate of piercing. This
suggests that cases that do not include an issue of fraud are typically
distributed. The difference in piercing the veil when fraud 0was
7
present, not present, or not mentioned was statistically significant.'
These statistics support the hypothesis that fraud cases are a
unique subset of piercing. They also strongly support the hypothesis
that a court is more likely to pierce if it finds fraud to be present than
if it finds that fraud is not present. Quite simply, where fraud or
misrepresentation is not found, courts refused to pierce in more than
nine out of ten cases, irrespective of the presence of other factors.
c.

Overlap

Overlap was the third most frequently discussed factor in parentsubsidiary piercing. Overlap, as a category, identifies activities,
persons, and places shared between the parent and the subsidiary,
such as common offices, common business activity, and common
employees, including directors and officers.
Overlap was discussed in 42.8% (n=154) of the piercing cases.
Courts found overlap to be present in 27.2% (n=98) of the cases and
pierced the corporate veil in 48.0% (n=47) of the cases in which
overlap was present. Courts refused to pierce in 52.0% (n=51) of the
cases in which overlap was present. Courts found that overlap was
not present in 15.6% (n=56) of108the cases coded and refused to pierce
in 92.9% (n=52) of these cases.

107. The results of the chi-square test for piercing and the fraud/misrepresentation
factor are: X'=94.584, d.f.=2, p < 0.001. The lower the probability (p), the less likely it is
that the results obtained in any given table occurred by chance. Here, the results in the
table would occur by chance in less than 1 out of 1,000 similar samples. Therefore, we can
reject the hypothesis that the decision to pierce is not related to a finding of fraud. Since
these findings strongly suggest a relationship between piercing and fraud, they will be
revisited in the regression analysis below.
108. These results were statistically significant. The results of the chi-square test for
piercing and the overlap factor are: X2=62.359, d.f.=2, p < 0.001. The lower the probability
(p), the less likely it is that the results obtained in any given table occurred by chance.
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Commingling of Funds

Commingling of funds was the next most frequently discussed
factor.
Comingling of funds was identified where the court
determined that the parent inappropriately combined the funds of the
subsidiary corporation with the parent's own funds. Commingling
was discussed in 35.8% (n=129) of the piercing cases. Courts found
commingling to be present in 15.6% (n=56) of the piercing cases. In
cases in which commingling was found to be present, courts pierced
75.0% (n=42) of the time and refused to pierce 25.0% (n=14) of the
time. The courts determined that commingling was not present in
20.3% (n=73) of the cases. Where courts found that commingling was
not present, they refused to pierce 95.9% (n=70) of the time. 09
e.

Undercapitalization
Undercapitalization was the fifth most discussed factor by courts.
This category addresses undercapitalization of the subsidiary when
the parent did not properly capitalize the entity from the outset, when
there was draining of the subsidiary's funds, or when there was
determined to be a failure to recapitalize. Undercapitalization was
discussed in 31.9% (n=115) of the piercing cases. The courts found
that undercapitalization was present in 12.2% (n=44) of the cases and
chose to pierce in 70.5% (n=31) of the cases where
undercapitalization was present. Courts refused to pierce in 29.5%
(n=13) of the cases where undercapitalization was found to be
present. Additionally, courts found that undercapitalization was not
present in 19.7% (n=71) of the cases and refused to pierce in 95.8%
(n=68) of these cases. ° These results support the hypothesis that
undercapitalization, especially a finding that undercapitalization is
not present, is related to a court's decision whether to pierce.

Here, the results in the table would occur by chance in less than 1 out of 1000 similar
samples.
109. This result was statistically significant. The results of the chi-square test for
piercing and the commingling factor are: X=122.796, d.f.=2, p < 0.001. The lower the
probability (p), the less likely it is that the results obtained in any given table occurred by
chance. Here, the results in the table would occur by chance in less than 1 out of 1000
similar samples.
110. This result was statistically significant. The results of the chi-square test for
piercing and the parent control/dominance factor are: X=175.409, d.f.=2, p <0.001.
Although undercapitalization will be revisited in the logistic regression below, it does not
reach statistical significance due to the small number of cases concerning
undercapitalization.
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Unfairness/Injustice

Unfairness or injustice is both a factor identified by the courts
and a conclusion that they apply to the facts."' Courts discussed
unfairness in 30.8% (n=111) of piercing cases. The courts determined
that unfairness was present in 7.5% (n=27) of cases and pierced in
92.6% (n=25) of these cases. Further, courts refused to pierce in
7.4% (n=2) of cases where unfairness was present.
Courts
determined that unfairness was not present in 23.3% (n=84) of cases
and refused to pierce in 95.2% (n=80) of these cases. Courts pierced
in 4.8% (n=4) of cases where unfairness was present. These results
were statistically significant."1 2 Thus, these results support the
hypothesis that unfairness is related to a court's determination of
whether to pierce and, therefore, should be included in the regression
analysis.
g.

Directors, Officers, or Records Non-Existent

This category identifies that some or all of the subsidiary's
directors or officers or other functionaries were never appointed or
that no corporate, financial, or other records were created at all.
Courts discussed management non-existence in 23.3% (n=84) of the
piercing cases. Courts determined that management non-existence
was present in 4.4% (n=16) of the cases and chose to pierce in 75%
(n=12) of these cases. Moreover, courts found that non-existence was
not present, which is to say that management existed, in 18.9% (n=68)
of the piercing cases and refused to pierce in 88.2% (n=60) of these
cases. Courts pierced in 11.8% (n=8) of the cases where management
existed." 3 These results support the hypothesis that the existence of
separate management in a subsidiary is related to a court's willingness
to pierce the corporate veil.

111. An indication of the latter is the question of whether the presence of some other
significant factor presages a finding of unfairness. For example, a chi-square test between
fraud/misrepresentation and unfairness/injustice revealed an association between the two
variables that was statistically significant. The results of the chi-square test for
fraud/misrepresentation and the unfairness/injustice factor are:
X'=62.275, d.f.=4,
p <0.001. Similarly, a chi-square test between dominance and unfairness/injustice also
revealed an association between the two variables that was statistically significant. The
results of the chi-square test for parent dominance/control and the unfairness/injustice
factor are: X2=81.598, d.f.=4, p < 0.001.
112.2 The results of the chi-square test for piercing and the unfairness/injustice factor
are: X=99.570, d.f.=2, p < 0.001.
113. These results were statistically significant. The results of the chi-square test for
piercing and the officers/directors nonexistent factor are: X'=32.426, d.f.=2, p < 0.001.
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Directors or Officers Non-Functioning

Courts discussed non-functioning management in 28.3% (n=102)
of piercing cases. This category identifies where directors and officers
were appointed but never or rarely held meetings or otherwise took
formal action. That is, even though corporate functionaries existed,
the business was run informally without recognition of titles or roles.
There is a potential overlap between the categories of non-existent
and non-functioning. For example, the failure of shareholders or
directors to hold meetings (therefore, no "minutes") or officers to
sign corporate documents as officers was coded as a "nonfunctioning"
informality, not a "non-existent" corporate record.
Courts determined that non-functioning management was
present in 6.4% (n=23) of cases and chose to pierce in 78.3% (n=18)
of these cases. Courts refused to pierce in 21.7% (n=5) of the cases
where non-functioning management was found. Courts found that
non-functioning management was not present, which is to say that
functioning management was present, in 21.9% (n=79) of the cases
and refused to pierce in 88.6% (n=70) of these cases. Courts chose to
pierce in 11.4% (n=9) of the cases in which functioning management
was present." 4
i. Combined Non-Existence and Non-Functioning of Directors
and Officers
Because non-existence and non-functioning of management are
highly correlated (r > 0.602), these two variables were combined to
avoid collinearity in the regression analysis that would decrease
significance.' 5
The combination of non-existence and nonfunctioning will be labeled as a "lack of management."

114. These results were statistically significant. The results of the chi-square test for
piercing and the officers/directors nonfunctioning factor are: x'=51.825, d.f.=2, p < 0.001.
These results support the hypothesis that the functioning of subsidiary management is
related to a court's decision whether to pierce. Therefore, these results will be revisited in
the logistic regression analysis below, though they will be combined with directors or
officers non-existent to avoid collinearity, as discussed below.
115. The combination of these two categories, nonexistent and nonfunctioning

management, respectively, were coded as follows. Cases coded 0 (explicitly not present)
and 99 (not mentioned as a factor) for the categories were coded as 0. Cases coded 1
(explicitly present) and 99 (not mentioned as a factor) for the categories were coded as 1.
When the two sets of coding were combined, cases coded as 1, 1 were coded as 1. Cases
coded as 0, 0 were coded as 0. Cases coded as 0, 1 were coded as 1. Cases coded as 99, 99
were coded as 99.
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Assumption of Risk

Assumption of risk was discussed in only 3.7% (n=13) of piercing
cases, demonstrating that assumption of risk is not generally a factor
that courts consider when determining whether to pierce. This factor
will not be included in the regression analysis due to the extremely

small number of cases concerning assumption of risk.
B.

Logistic Regression Analysis
1. Explanation of Statistical Analysis Process

The foregoing descriptive statistics and analysis suggest that
there are meaningful associations between the dependent variable
(piercing the corporate veil) and certain independent variables (e.g.,
fraud, domination, and overlap). This kind of data analysis, known as
bivariate analysis, explores the concept of association between two
variables. Bivariate analysis," 6 however, fails to control for other
independent variables, thereby allowing statistical confounding.1 17
Bivariate analysis also cannot tell us the strength of any relationship
between the variables.
Regression analysis is the generally recognized statistical
technique" 8 for analysis of numerical data consisting of values of a
116. The cross-tabulation of an independent variable with the dependent variable, as
shown above in Tables 6 through 9, is a form of bivariate analysis.
117. See DAVID COPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 67 (2005)

("When a correlation coefficient misleads as to the strength of a causal connection
between two correlated variables because it reflects not only the relationship between
those variables but also the influence of one or more other variables whose individual
effects can't easily be isolated and assessed, there is said to be confounding."). While all
statistical models are susceptible to confounding variables, certain models, such as the
logistic regression analysis employed herein, are able to control for the independent
variables included in the model.
118. Thirty years ago, Michael Finklestein wrote:
The term "regression," as it is used here, refers to a certain technique for
estimating a mathematical relationship between factors on the basis of numerical
data. The use of regression has become firmly established as the standard method
of analysis in econometric (mathematical economic) models used by both public
and private decision makers in formulating and examining policies. The same
techniques are now beginning to be used in dealing with important issues in
sharply contested regulatory proceedings; in these contexts the precision,
reliability, and usefulness of regression methodology have become a special
province and concern of lawyers.
MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 211 (1978). See generally
Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructurefor Empirical Research in the Law,
53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2003) (discussing the use of empirical research methodologies in
legal scholarship); Howell E. Jackson, Analytical Methods for Lawyers, 53 J. LEGAL
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dependent variable (response variable) and of one or more
independent variables (explanatory variables).' 19 Multiple regression

analysis is the technique used when the study has more than two
variables, as does the study of parent-subsidiary piercing cases. 2 ° A
peculiar and important benefit of multiple regression analysis is that it
allows us to take account of all additional relevant factors for
which we have data. We develop a multiple regression

equation that includes all relevant explanatory variables (or at
least as many as practicable) and then focus on the coefficient
of the variable of interest ....

This coefficient ... reflects the

magnitude of the relationship between [piercing results and the
specific factor identified] when the influence of the other
predictor variables is accounted for.'2 '

As described above, the dependent variable for the current

parent-subsidiary study is whether a court chose to pierce the
corporate veil in a particular case. Because the dependent variable
has only two possible values (0-no pierce or 1-pierce), it is known
as a dichotomous variable.'22
As an initial matter, classical linear regression coefficients would
seem, on the surface, to be an adequate means of analyzing a
dichotomous variable with values of 0 and 1. The regression
coefficients will show an increase or decrease in the predicted
probability of piercing the corporate veil due to a one-unit change of
the independent variables.
When working with dichotomous
categorical values, however, linear regression models produce a line
that can extend upward toward positive infinity and downward
EDUC. 321 (2003) (explaining the importance of regression and other analytical methods
in the legal field).
119. COPE, supra note 117, at 70-80.
120. Id. at 83-85; see also G. David Garson, Multiple Regression, in Statnotes: Topics in
Multivariate Analysis, http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/regress.htm (last visited
Mar. 30, 2009) ("Multiple regression, a time-honored technique going back to Pearson's
1908 use of it, is employed to account for (predict) the variance in an interval dependent,
based on linear combinations of interval, dichotomous, or dummy independent variables.
Multiple regression can establish that a set of independent variables explains a proportion
of the variance in a dependent variable at a significant level (through a significance test of
R'), and can establish the relative predictive importance of the independent variables (by
comparing beta weights).").
121. COPE, supra note 117, at 84-85.
122. In addition, all of the variables present in this analysis are categorical rather than
numerical. That is, they represent a category or event, such as the court piercing or not
piercing the veil, or a court finding or not finding fraud to be present. Since these events
do not have any true numerical value, a number is assigned to each event. These are then
referred to as the dummy variables, because they do not represent any specific numerical
value.
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toward negative infinity. This produces nonsensical results because

the dependent variable (pierce or no pierce) is bounded at 0 and

1.123

The favored analytical tool for analysis involving dichotomous
dependent variables such as the current study is called logistic
regression analysis.124 Phrased more simply and elegantly than I
could:
Logistic regression is a variation of ordinary regression which is

used when the dependent (response) variable is a dichotomous
variable (i.e. it takes only two values, which usually represent

the occurrence or non-occurrence of some outcome event,
usually coded as 0 or 1), and the independent (input) variables

are continuous, categorical, or both. For instance, in a medical
study, the patient survives or dies. Unlike ordinary linear
regression, logistic regression does not assume that the
123. FRED C. PAMPEL, LOGISTIC REGRESSION: A PRIMER 3-10 (2000). Dichotomous
dependent variables require a transformation that will eliminate the floor and ceiling by
allowing for decreasing effects of the independent variables as the probabilities approach 0
and 1. Analysis of dichotomous dependent variables requires a statistic that will not
create probabilities outside the bounds of 0 and 1, that is, a non-linear model. Non-linear
simply means that, rather than a straight line, the model creates an S-curve. The S-curve
will have a relatively steep slope at probabilities of 0.5, and the slope will flatten as it
approaches 0 and 1 so that it will create asymptotes approaching but never reaching 0 and
1. This S-curve will represent decreasing effects of the independent variable on the
probability of the dependent variable as the probability approaches 0 or 1. The logit
transformation has become a popular tool for this transformation. Id.
In order to achieve non-linearity, the logit begins by transforming probabilities
into odds and then taking the natural log of the odds. Probabilities have values between 0
and 1. Odds are the ratio of the probability over one minus the probability, or p/(l-p).
This transformation eliminates the problem with upper bound that probabilities impose.
The logit coefficient is the natural log of the odds. The formula for a logit coefficient then
is ln(p/(1-p)). Taking the natural log is done to eliminate the problem with a lower bound.
A regression is then performed using the logit, and the analysis is referred to as a logistic
regression, which results in a logit coefficient as its primary explanatory variable. Id.
124. See Garson, supra note 120 ("Binomial (or binary) logistic regression is a form of
regression which is used when the dependent is a dichotomy and the independents are of
any type .... Logistic regression can be used to predict a dependent variable on the basis
of continuous and/or categorical independents and to determine the percent of variance in
the dependent variable explained by the independents; to rank the relative importance of
independents; to assess interaction effects; and to understand the impact of covariate
control variables. The impact of predictor variables is usually explained in terms of odds
ratios.").
This form of logistic regression is the means of analysis used by Swain & Aguilar.
See supra note 29, at 446. For other studies using this technique, see generally Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1120 (1996) (using logistic regression to study the effect of foreignness on favorable
verdicts); Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, And Credentials: The
Truth about Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1997)
(using logistic regression to study the effects of sex and race on tenure-track hiring at law
schools).
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relationship between the independent variables and the
dependent variable is a linear one. Nor does it assume that the
dependent variable or the error terms are distributed normally.
The form of the model is

log(-)
I-P

=

+...
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values of log(p/(1-p))

where p is the probability that Y=1 and X1, X2,..., Xk are the
independent variables (predictors) bO, bl, b2, ... , bk are
known as the regression coefficients, which have to be
estimated from the data. Logistic regression estimates the
probability of a certain event occurring. Logistic regression
thus forms a predictor variable (log (p/(l-p)) which is a linear
combination of the explanatory variables. The values of this
predictor variable are then transformed into probabilities by a
logistic function. Such a function has the shape of an S. On the
horizontal axis we have the values of the predictor variable, and
on the vertical axis we have the probabilities.
Logistic regression also produces Odds Ratios (O.R.)
associated with each predictor value. The "odds" of an event is
defined as the probability of the outcome event occurring
divided by the probability of the event not occurring. In
general, the "odds ratio" is one set of odds divided by another.
The odds ratio for a predictor is defined as the relative amount
by which the odds of the outcome increase (O.R. greater than
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1.0) or decrease (O.R. less than 1.0) when the value of the
predictor variable is increased by 1.0 units. In other words,
(odds for PV+1)/(odds for PV) where PV is the value of the
predictor variable. z5
Logistic regression analysis, then, both simultaneously controls
for all other independent variables included in the model when
evaluating the effects of each independent variable on the dependent
variable, and measures the strength of the relationship of each
independent variable in the researcher's model to the dependent
variable. Therefore, using logistic regression, one can ask the
question: what is the effect of a particular variable regardless of the
values of the other independent variables?
Logistic regression
analysis allows us to determine the statistical significance of each of
the factors that, as discussed above, descriptively seemed to have an
impact on the likelihood of a court to pierce the corporate veil.
2. Parent-Subsidiary Logistic Regression Model-Legal Piercing
Factors
Based upon the hypotheses and courts' statements about what
factors would affect the outcome of a piercing case, the first
theoretical model included the following independent variables:
fraud/misrepresentation, commingling of funds, undercapitalization,
overlap,
lack
of
management,
unfairness,
and
parent
control/dominance. These are the variables that the descriptive
statistics suggest are related to a determination of whether to pierce.
Tables 10 and 11 present the results of the logistic regression
analysis of the dependent variable on the effect of the independent
variables that were included in the first theoretical model. Table 10
uses cases where the factor is not discussed at all as the comparison
situation (that is, as the reference variable), and Table 11 uses cases
where the factor was determined not to be present as the comparison
situation (that is, as the reference variable).'2 6
In these tables, the first statistic is the logit coefficient. These
coefficients show the direction and relative strength of effects for
125. Cytel Statistical Software, Logistic Regression, http://www.resample.com/xlminer/
help/Lreg/lreg-intro.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
126. The values are generated in the regression analysis using the dependent variable
and a reference variable. The reference variable for these tests generally is "99" (that is,
for cases in which the variable is not discussed), though it is sometimes useful to set the
reference as "0" (that is, for cases when the variable is not found). The values generated
are then a comparison of the likelihood of the dependent variable occurring when the
independent variable is present compared to when the reference variable is present.
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Negative coefficients are

interpreted as moving the value of the dependent variable toward the
"no pierce" category, and positive coefficients are interpreted as
moving the dependent variable toward the "pierce" category. The
column labeled "p value" presents the probability value associated
with each coefficient.

When the p value is below 0.05, the

relationship is statistically significant, and we can reject the
hypothesis that there is no relationship between the independent and
dependent variable.'2 7 The column showing the odds ratio tells us the

ratio of the probability that some event will occur over the probability
that the same event will not occur.'28 Finally, the last two columns
state the upper and lower confidence intervals for the odds ratio. 2 9
Based on the results of the logistic regression analyses
summarized in Tables 10 and 11, the variables that emerged as
statistically significant 30 are fraud/misrepresentation, commingling,

overlap, unfairness/injustice, and parent control/dominance. Each of

127. The interpretation of the probability here is the same as in the chi-square values
presented above in connection with the descriptive statistics. When the p value is below
0.05, the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the independent and
dependent variable is rejected. In the tables, p values between 0.05 and 0.10 are treated as
marginally significant.
128. A word of explanation and caution regarding the concept and significance of odds
ratios, which may often appear as inflated if not unrealistic probabilities: Odds and
probability are two different ways to express the likelihood of an outcome. The
probability of something happening is the ratio of the number of times it does happen over
the number of times it could happen. For flipping a coin, the probability of heads is 1/2
(0.5) and the probability of rolling a dice so that it comes up as a six is 1/6 (0.16). Odds, in
comparison, represent the ratio of the number of times something does happen over the
number of times it does not happen. The denominator in an odds determination is smaller
than in a probability determination, making the odds calculation by definition a larger
number than a probability calculation. Once again, for a coin flip, the odds are 1/1 (1) and
the odds for the dice throw of six is 1/5 (0.2). The "odds ratio" then normally magnifies
this distinction, because it is one set of odds divided by another. Although odds ratios in
logistic regression analysis are instructive, they should be read with these limitations in
mind and are most useful when compared to other odds ratios relating to the same
regression or other statistical inquiry.
129. See Garson, supra note 120 ("Confidence interval on the odds ratio. SPSS labels
the odds ratio Exp(B) and prints Low and High confidence levels for it. If the low-high
range contains the value 1.0, then being in that variable value category makes no
difference on the odds of the dependent, compared to being in the reference (usually
highest) value for that variable. That is, when the ninety-five percent confidence interval
around the odds ratio includes the value of 1.0, indicating that a change in value of the
independent variable is not associated in change in the odds of the dependent variable
assuming a given value, then that variable is not considered a useful predictor in the
logistic model.").
130. In the tables, the p values that represent statistical significance are in bold type.
See supra note 81 for an explanation of the significance determination.
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these variables will be addressed separately. Undercapitalization and
lack of management were not statistically significant.

Table 10: Logistic Regression Analysis with Piercing as Dependent
3
Variable and with Not Discussed as Reference Variable1 1
95.0% C.I. for OR
Lower

Upper

131. Number of cases = 360. In traditional ordinary least squares ("OLS") regression
analysis, the value of the R2 indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable
(pierce or no pierce) is explained by the independent variables (e.g., fraud, commingling,
undercapitalization, overlap, lack of management, unfairness/injustice, or parent
control/dominance). A standard R' value cannot be calculated for any logit model, so
several variants approximating the explanatory nature of OLS R2 values have been
developed to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of logistic models. The Pseudo R' value is
roughly equivalent to the traditional R2 value reported in standard OLS regression, and
ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating better model fit. For Table 10, the
Pseudo R' values are: Cox and Snell = 0.502, and Nagelkerke = 0.787. These values
indicate that the first model explains anywhere from 50% to 79% of the variance in the
piercing of the corporate veil.
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-1.149

0.201

0.317

0.0551

2.797
9

0.008

16.395

2.094

1.843
128.389

t111anLCe

Table 11: Logistic Regression Analysis with Piercing as Dependent
Variable and with Not Present as Reference Variable'3 2

Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

2
0.725

U.UU
0.216

19U.964
2.064

14.114
0.654

2384.248
6.516

Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

2.647
1.192

0.007
0.170

14.115
3.292

2.056
0.600

96.888
18.060

Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

0.733
0.259

0.509
0.757

2.080
1.296

0.236
0.251

18.317
6.697

Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

0.024

0.976
.2-1.869

1.024
0.154

0.219
0.031

4.793
0.761

Present vs. Not Present
PrNtics vs. Notsn046
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

0.446

0.675

1.561

0.195

12.500

0.141

0.851

1.152

0.263

5.041

132. Number of cases = 360. Pseudo R= Cox and Snell: .496, and Nagelkerke: .778.
The values reported indicate that this model explains anywhere from 50% to 78% of the
variance in the piercing of the corporate veil.
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k'resent vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

44.J91

1.15/ /

.

1.094

. /.93 U.UU4

0.216

2.987

0.529

16.882

4.006
1.466

.000
042

54.915
4.332

10.533
1.055

286.312
17.791

Cointrn Doium~iance
Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

The fraud/misrepresentation factor emerges as statistically
significant as well as having the largest effect of any of the variables in
the first model. 33 The positive coefficient 3 indicates that the effect

of a finding of fraud/misrepresentation increases the likelihood that
the court will pierce the corporate veil. This result is consistent with
the findings in Table 9. The odds ratio of piercing when fraud was
present to when it is not discussed shows that the court was 92 times
more likely to pierce the corporate subsidiary's veil.
Comparing
the odds of piercing when fraud was present to the odds of piercing
when fraud was not present, the court was approximately 191 times
more likely to pierce the veil. 36

Commingling also emerged as statistically significant. The
positive coefficient 137 indicates that the effect of a finding of
commingling increases the probability that the court will pierce the
corporate veil. This result is also consistent with the findings in Table
9. Comparing when commingling was present to when it was not
discussed, a court was approximately 4.2 times more likely to pierce
the corporate veil. Comparing when commingling was present to
when it was not present, a court was approximately 14 times more
likely to pierce the veil.

133. The model includes all variables found to be statistically significant in the
descriptive analysis.
134. This is the coefficient for present versus not present and present versus not
discussed.
135. For this odds ratio, the confidence interval is from 7 to 1,159. Since the 95%
confidence interval around the odds ratio does not include the value of 1.0, the fraud
variable is considered a useful predictor in the logistic model. See supranote 128.
136. The confidence interval for the odds ratio was from 14 to 2,584.
137. This is the coefficient for present versus not present and present versus not
discussed.
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Overlap also emerged as statistically significant in certain
circumstances.
Overlap was not statistically significant when
comparing when overlap was present to when it was not present.
Overlap was statistically significant when comparing whether it was
present or not to whether it was discussed or not. Discussion of
overlap as a factor (whether or not it was found) increases the
probability that the court will pierce the corporate veil. Discussing
whether or not overlap was found made the court 7.8 to 8.6 times
more likely to pierce the corporate veil. 38
Unfairness/injustice was also statistically significant in certain
circumstances. Unfairness was statistically significant when it was
present versus not discussed and present versus not present. If
unfairness was considered as a factor, the court was 16.4 times more
likely to pierce the corporate veil than in those cases where unfairness
was not discussed. If unfairness was deemed present, the court was
44.4 times more likely to pierce the veil than in those cases where it
was not present.
Finally, parent control/dominance was always statistically
significant. Parent control/dominance as not present versus not
discussed was significant, and the negative coefficient indicates that,
when the court finds it not present, it is less likely to pierce the
corporate veil by a factor. When the factor is present versus not
discussed, the court is approximately 15 times more likely to pierce
the corporate veil. When parent control/dominance is present as
opposed to not present, the court is approximately 55 times more
likely to pierce the veil. Parent control/dominance not discussed
compared to it not being present is related to the court being 4.3
times more likely to pierce the corporate veil.
3. Variation I: Controlling for Fraud and Control/Dominance
As noted in both the descriptive data and the results from the
logistic regression analysis, fraud/misrepresentation and parent
control/dominance are far and away the most significant factors in the
courts' piercing analysis. Interaction between variables should be
addressed not only to be comprehensive but also because it provides
valuable insight into the phenomenon of piercing the corporate veil.
The classic example of interaction is the effect of one variable
becoming stronger or weaker depending on the level of another
variable. When a significant interaction may be expected in a data
138. The confidence interval for not present versus not discussed is from 1.6 to 45.2.
The confidence interval for present versus not discussed is from 2.0 to 29.8.
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set, one exploratory approach is to estimate odds ratios separately for
one of the two factors involved in the interaction. For example, when
investigating the interaction between fraud/misrepresentation and
overlap in a logistic regression predicting piercing of the veil, the
simplest method is to look at the odds ratio relating to overlap and
piercing the veil first when fraud is present only, and then when fraud
is not present only. 39
Tables 12 and 13 present the logistic regression analyses of
various legal piercing factors with the dependent variable of piercing
1 40
the corporate veil when fraud/misrepresentation is not present.
That is, what do the courts view as most important when they fail to
find that there has been any significant misrepresentation of the
relationship between the parent and the subsidiary? This analysis had
a sample size of 141 (n=141). The variables that emerged as
statistically significant were overlap and unfairness/injustice, with
parent control/dominance showing marginal significance.
As Table 12 shows, when fraud/misrepresentation was not
present, a finding of overlap being present as opposed to not
discussed increased the odds of the court piercing the corporate veil
to 90.6 times. Without controlling for fraud, the court was only 7.8
times more likely to pierce in this situation.
When
fraud/misrepresentation is not found, a court relies more heavily upon
a finding of overlap in its determination to pierce.
A particularly interesting finding is that where a court found no
overlap as opposed to not discussed, such a finding increased the odds
of the court piercing the corporate veil to 58.3 times. Previously,
when the study did not control for fraud/misrepresentation, a finding
of overlap being not present versus not discussed only increased the
odds by 8.6 times. Therefore, the court simply discussing overlap as a
factor when fraud/misrepresentation was not present made the court
much more likely to pierce the corporate veil when compared to the
court not discussing overlap as a factor. Of course, where no overlap
exists, as compared to that factor not being discussed, the negative
139. Due to restrictions based on the amount of data collected, the traditional
interaction assessment between the variables would not produce viable results. Even the

type of analysis actually employed here is also limited by the size of the database, and
therefore, the ability to get statistically significant results is limited when slicing the data

into smaller and smaller pieces.
140. A similar analysis for determining when fraud was present could not be run due to
the small number of cases where fraud was found present-only 26 of 360 cases. Likewise,
this analysis could not be complete for unfairness/injustice because of the small number of

cases where unfairness was found to be present, n=27 cases, and the small number of cases
where it was found to be present, n=84 cases.
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coefficient in Table 13 demonstrates that the court is less likely to
1 41
pierce.
A finding of unfairness/injustice being present as opposed to not
discussed in Table 12 resulted in the court being 490.8 times more
likely to pierce when fraud/misrepresentation was not present.
Before controlling for fraud/misrepresentation, this situation resulted
in the court being 16.4 times more likely to pierce. Not surprisingly,
as Table 13 illustrates, a finding of unfairness/injustice being present
as opposed to not present resulted in the court being 4,300 times
more likely to pierce the corporate veil when fraud/misrepresentation
was found not present.142 Therefore, a finding of unfairness/injustice
is highly influential on the court when fraud/misrepresentation is not
found. In some sense, a finding of fraud or misrepresentation may be
taken to imply unfairness or injustice, whereas, when fraud is not
present, a finding of unfairness/injustice as a stand-alone factor is
crucial to the decision to pierce.

141. This finding is statistically significant (p=0.014) but does not affect the odds ratio
significantly (0.017).
142. A finding of parent control/dominance being present as opposed to not present
was marginally significant and resulted in the court being 10.7 times more likely to pierce
the corporate veil when fraud/misrepresentation was not present.
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Table 12: Logistic Regression Analysis When
Fraud/Misrepresentation Is Not Present with Not Discussed as
143
Reference Variable

143. Number of cases = 141. Pseudo R2 =Cox and Snell: 0.240, Nagelkerke: 0.543.
The values reported indicate that the model explains anywhere from 24% to 54.3% of the
variance in the piercing of the corporate veil.
144. When the p value is below 0.05, the null hypothesis that there is no relationship
between the independent and dependent variable was rejected. In the table, p values
between 0.05 and 0.10 are treated as marginally significant.
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Table 13: Logistic Regression Analysis When
Fraud/Misrepresentation Is Not Present with Not Present as
45
Reference Variable1

Tables 14 and 15 present the logistic regression analyses of
various factors with the dependent variable of piercing the corporate
145. Number of cases = 141. Pseudo R2 = Cox and Snell: 0.240, Nagelkerke: 0.543.
The values reported indicate that the model explains anywhere from 24% to 54.3% of the
variance in the piercing of the corporate veil.

2009]

MODERN LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS

1147

veil when parent control/dominance is not present. The effort here
was to test the outcome if the court has affirmatively found that no
excessive parent domination exists. This analysis had a sample size of
142 cases (n=142). In this context, no individual variables emerged as
statistically significant. 46

Table 14: Logistic Regression Analysis When Parent
Control/Dominance Is Not Present with Not Discussed as Reference
147
Variable

146. This result likely is due at least in part to the relatively small sample size.
147. Number of cases - 142. Pseudo R2 = Cox and Snell: 0.240, Nagelkerke: 0.543.
The values reported indicate that the model explains anywhere from 24% to 54.3% of the
variance in the piercing of the corporate veil.
148. When the p value is below 0.05, the null hypothesis that there is no relationship
between the independent and dependent variable is rejected. In the table, p-values
between 0.05 and 0.10 are treated as marginally significant.
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Table 15: Logistic Regression Analysis When Parent
Control/Dominance is Not Present with Not Present as Reference
Variable'4 9

Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

-16.691

1.000

0.000

0.000

-1.116

0.452

0.327

0.05

Present vs. Not Present
Cong~cp~ligio
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

0.652

0.9000

1.91

0.000

1.487

0.510

4.423

0.053

-17.293

0.999
0.743

0.000

0.000

0.541

014

21.317

004

098

105

004

4.3

-17.056

0.998
0.978

0.000 0.000
1.055 10.024 1

Present vs. Not Present
Ovn~erapitlzto
NtDsusdv.Nt-0.614
Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present vs. N ot Present
No
Present

isuse
s.Nt0,054

3 6.011

---370.657

-----

----46533

149. Number of cases 141. Pseudo R'= Cox and Snell: 0.039, Nagelkerke: 0.212.
The values reported indicate that the model explains anywhere from 3.9% to 21.2% of the
variance in the piercing of the corporate veil.
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95.0% C.I. for OR
Lower
Upper

Logit
Coefficient

p Value

Odds
Ratio for
Piercing

Present vs. Not Present

-15.390

0.999

0.000

0.000

Not Discussed vs. Not
Present
Unfairness/Injustice
Present vs. Not Present

-0.570

0.796

0.566

0.007

42.863

1.286

0.563

3.617

0.046

282.204

-3.614

0.114

0.027

0.000

2.393

V

ble

Lack of Management

Assumption of Risk
Present vs. Not Present

-----

4. Variation II: Interaction of Parent Control/Dominance with Other
Factors
As the last two tables indicate, when excessive parental
control/dominance is not found, no other individual factors stood out

as statistically significant. Nevertheless, the major piercing factor of
excessive parent control/dominance may have other interrelations
and indeed may operate more as a conclusion than as an analytical
variable. For example, we have seen that excessive parental control
appears to be a major determination in whether a court will pierce the
corporate veil, but it may be simply another phrase for the court's
conclusion to pierce.150 One way to explore this issue is to take the
significant variables/conclusions and see how much of the variation in
the parental control determination by the courts can be tied to the
absence or presence of the other variables.
Tables 16 and 17 present the results of the logistic regression
analysis using parent control/dominance as the dependent variable."'

Cases in which parent control/dominance was not discussed were not
included in this analysis, therefore, the data set included only the 203
150. For example, the court in Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d
509, 512 (Minn. 1979), listed eight factors for consideration in the initial step of a piercing
analysis. One of those factors was stated to be the "existence of corporation as merely a
faqade for individual dealings." Id. However, it is not clear whether this is really an
analytical factor or merely the court's conclusion with respect to its consideration of other
factors.
151. The coefficients show the direction and relative strength of effects for each of the
independent variables. The column labeled level of statistical significance presents the
probability value associated with each coefficient. The interpretation of this probability is
the same as in the X2 values presented above. When the p-value is below 0.05, the null
hypothesis that there is no relationship between the independent and dependent variable
is rejected. In the table, p-values between 0.05 and 0.10 are treated as marginally
significant.
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cases that discussed parent control/dominance, finding it either
present or not present.
The variables that emerged as statistically significant were
fraud/misrepresentation, commingling, and unfairness/injustice.
Therefore, these variables are statistically and legally connected with
a finding of parent control/dominance that supports the piercing
determination.
Undercapitalization,15 2 overlap,'53 and lack of
5
4
management were marginally significant in certain situations.
Table 16: Logistic Regression Analysis of Dominance with Not
Discussed as Reference Variable'55
Variable

Fraud/Misrepresentation
Not Present vs. Not
Discussed
Present vs. Not
Discussed

.Logit
..... .
" Rt~irig~
Odds
p
Coefficient Value-6 Ratio for
Pierci

95.0% C.I' for OR
Lower
Upper
_

0.586

0.306

1.796

0.585

5.513

2.933

0.006

18.782

2.364

149.219

-0.504

0.539

0.604

0.121

3.022

1.613

0.038

5.016

1.096

22.957

0.191

0.805

1.210

0.266

5.500

1.436

0.100

4.206

0.760

23.269

Commingling

Not Present vs. Not
Discussed
Present vs. Not
Discussed

Undercapitalization
Not Present vs. Not
Discussed
Present vs. Not
Discussed

152. Undercapitalization was marginally statistically significant with a p-value of 0.100,
comparing when undercapitalization was present to when it was not discussed, and a court
was approximately 4.2 times more likely to find parent control/dominance.
153. Overlap was marginally statistically significant, with a p value of 0.094, comparing
when overlap was present to when it was not present, and a court was 8.3 times more
likely to find parent control/dominance.
154. Lack of management was marginally statistically significant with a p-value of
0.055, comparing when lack of management was present to when it was not present. In
these cases, the court was approximately 10.8 times more likely to find parent
control/dominance.
155. Number of cases = 203. Pseudo R2 = Cox and Snell: 0.467, Nagelkerke: 0.663.
The values reported indicate that the model explains anywhere from 46.7% to 66.3% of
the variance in the parent control/dominance.
156. When the p-value is below 0.05, the null hypothesis that there is no relationship
between the independent and dependent variable is rejected. In the table, p values
between 0.05 and 0.10 are treated as marginally significant.

2009]

MODERN LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS

1151

Fraud/misrepresentation emerged as statistically significant in
both tables. The positive coefficient 5 7 indicates that the effect of a
finding of fraud/misrepresentation was to make the court more likely
to find parent control/dominance when there was evidence of
misrepresentation. Comparing when fraud was present to when it
was not discussed, the court was approximately 18.8 times more likely
to find parent control/dominance.
Comparing when fraud/
misrepresentation was present to when it was not present, the court
was approximately 10.4 times more likely to find parent
control/dominance.
Commingling emerged as statistically significant in both
circumstances as well. Once again, the positive coefficient indicates
that the effect of a finding of commingling was to make the court
more likely to find parent control/dominance. Comparing when
commingling was present to when it was not discussed, the court was
approximately 5 times more likely to find parent control/ dominance.
Comparing when commingling was present to when it was not
present, the court was approximately 8.3 times more likely to find
parent control/dominance.

157. This is the coefficient for present versus not present and present versus not
discussed.
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Table 17: Logistic Regression Analysis of Dominance with Not
Present as Reference Variable
Variable
Fraud/Misrepresentation
Present vs. Not Present
Not
vs. Not
Pnt Discussed
D-0.586
Present
Commingling
Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present
Undercapitalization
Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present
Overlap
Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present
Lack of Management
Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present
Unfairness/Injustice
Present vs. Not Present
Not Discussed vs. Not
Present

Varabl

P

Odds

95.0% C.I. for

Coefficient

Value

Ratio for
Piercing

Lower

2.347

0.021
0.306

10.457
0.557

1.416
0.181

77.227
1.709

2.117
0.504

0.034
0.539

8.306
1.656

1.169
0.331

59.000
8.286

1.246
-0.191

0.242
0.805

3.475
0.826

0.431
0.182

28.012
3.756

2.117
1.058

0.094
0.405

8.308
2.879

0.699
0.239

98.748
34.687

2.380
1.071

0.055
0.186

10.803
2.919

0.953

122.411

0.596

14.301

23.121
1.435

0.997
0.038

N/A
4.200

0.000
1.079

N/A
16.345

ORUpper

Unfairness/injustice also emerged as statistically significant. The
negative coefficient for unfairness not discussed as compared to not
present indicates that the effect of unfairness/injustice not being
present was to make the court less likely to find parent
control/dominance. Comparing when unfairness/injustice was not
discussed to when it was found not present, the court was
approximately 0.24 times less likely to find parent control/dominance.
Comparing when unfairness/injustice was present to when it was not
present, the court was approximately 4.2 times more likely to find
parent control/dominance.
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Consequently, the combination of the significant and marginally
significant variables explained from about one-half to two-thirds of
the variation when courts would find excessive parent control or
dominance."" Query whether this qualifies excessive parent control
as a conclusion as opposed to an independent variable. In any event,
the ties between a finding of these factors and the determination of
excessive parent control/dominance are unmistakable, if not
surprising.
CONCLUSION

The best way to summarize the results of the current study is to
answer the research hypotheses posed at its inception, first revisiting
the original hypothesis and then assessing its validity.
1. Piercing occurs with the same frequency in the parentsubsidiary situation as in the overall universe of piercing
decisions. UNTRUE. Piercing occurs about half as often as in
the overall universe of piercing decisions. The current study
found a much lower rate of piercing when compared to the
Thompson study. This deviation appears to be caused by a
combination of factors, including the observance of appropriate
boundaries by corporate shareholders, the reification of
"corporateness" in the parent-subsidiary context, and the
relative intractability of corporate group litigation. In any
event, there is a clear reluctance of courts to hold the parent
liable for the acts of the subsidiary barring some
fraud/misrepresentation or some truly extraordinary and
excessive parental control or dominance.
2. Piercing occurs with relatively equal frequency in the
parent-subsidiary context irrespective of the level of court
making the determination. UNTRUE. The current study
found statistically significant differences between trial,
appellate, and supreme courts, with supreme courts piercing at
almost twice the rate of trial courts.
3. Piercing occurs with relatively equal frequency in the
parent-subsidiary context, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
an individual or an entity. UNTRUE. This study found that
corporate entities are more likely than individuals to persuade a
158. Number of cases = 203. Pseudo R2 = Cox and Snell: 0.467, Nagelkerke: 0.663.
The values reported indicate that the model explains anywhere from 46.7% to 66.3% of
the variance in the parent control/dominance.
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court to pierce. Indeed, they are more than twice as likely to
pierce.
Various factors could account for this disparity,
including (1) the relative inequality of resources that may be
available to entity plaintiffs, and (2) the fact that courts pierce
more often in contract cases, which are most often brought by
corporate entities, while individuals are more likely to bring tort
claims.
4. Piercing occurs with relatively equal frequency in the
parent-subsidiary context in tort cases and in contract cases.
UNTRUE. Courts were three times more likely to pierce in
contracts than in tort cases. This finding confirmed generally
the results of previous studies, although the divergence in the
parent-subsidiary context is much greater.
5. The decision to pierce in the parent-subsidiary context is
not significantly influenced by a finding of fraud or
misrepresentation.
UNTRUE. In the logistic regression
analyses
reported
in this
study,
a finding
of
fraud/misrepresentation had far and away the most significant
effect on the decision of a court to pierce. Nevertheless, courts
found fraud to exist in less than ten percent of the parentsubsidiary cases that were studied here. In addition, where
courts affirmatively found fraud not to exist, piercing occurred
in less than ten percent of the cases, irrespective of the presence
or absence of any other factor or factors.
6. The decision to pierce in the parent-subsidiary context is
not significantly influenced by a finding of extraordinary and
excessive parent control/dominance. UNTRUE. Parental
control and dominance was the factor (or conclusion) most
addressed by courts. Given, however, the normal control that
sole ownership of all shares of stock of a corporation entails, it
is surprising that the courts found the factor of parental control
or dominance to exist in less than sixteen percent of the parentsubsidiary piercing cases. There does not appear to be any
judicial trend toward finding unlimited liability of parent
corporations for the operations of their subsidiaries; rather, the
opposite continues in both the law and the case results.
7. The decision to pierce in the parent-subsidiary context is
not significantly influenced by a finding of overlap between the
parent and subsidiary. TRUE AND UNTRUE. In the
descriptive statistics, overlap of various corporate offices,
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officers, and functions appeared important to the courts.
Overlap was the third most frequently addressed factor,
although the courts pierced in only half the cases where overlap
was determined to exist, which was not statistically significant.
Nevertheless, when fraud is eliminated as an operative variable,
even a discussion of overlap results in a significant increase in
the likelihood of piercing.
8. The factor of parent control/dominance is a conclusory
term that incorporates other factors in its determination.
UNCLEAR. When parent control/dominance was eliminated
as an operative variable, no other variable individually rose to a
level of statistical significance.
However, when parent
control/dominance was employed as the dependent variable,
the other factors explained were all statistically significant (or
marginally significant) to parent control/dominance and
explained somewhere between approximately one-half to twothirds of the variation in parent control/dominance.

This Article offers an initial foray into the empirical data
informing the policy debate over the application of piercing doctrine
in the parent-subsidiary context. The purpose was to add a factual
information overlay on this debate and to provide an introductory,
though certainly not exhaustive, statistical analysis of the results. The
results belie the arguments from several and diverse quarters calling
for expansion of corporate group liability.
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